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Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of mandatory disclosure regimes
under U.S. federal securities law with the express purpose of advancing
geographically defined, issue-specific social policy objectives, which I collectively
refer to as “targeted social transparency” (TST) regimes. This Article addresses the
appeal and shortcomings of mandatory disclosure as a means of regulating global
corporate conduct—focusing on the unique challenges posed by TST. Two
contemporary examples of TST are analyzed: (i) the “conflict minerals” provisions in
the Dodd-Frank Act, which require the disclosure of minerals whose mining is
associated with human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (ii)
disclosure requirements under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
with respect to commercial activities associated with the Iranian government’s
suppression of human rights. This Article presents the concept of constructive
discourse, which seeks to enhance the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure by
addressing these related objectives: (i) how TST can catalyze internally driven
changes in corporate behavior to the mutual benefit of MNEs and stakeholders; and
(ii) how MNEs can use TST for strategic purposes. Using the concept of constructive
discourse, this Article identifies and explores specific ways that TST regimes can
shape socially beneficial, strategically rational corporate conduct.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Governance of the international economy increasingly hinges on
awareness and knowledge concerning the activities of multinational
enterprises (MNEs).1 One mechanism to achieve this objective is
mandatory disclosure of information by MNEs and other business entities
to the public. Public concern about the noneconomic effects of global
business has led to the growing use of mandatory disclosure to advance
social goals—such as international human rights and environmental
sustainability—under the rubric of social transparency. The concept of
social transparency mandates the reporting of various adverse social and
environmental impacts by the firm responsible for causing them.2 Social
transparency expands the scope of a company’s obligations to a broader set
of parties, often referred to as stakeholders, which can affect or are affected
by its decisions.3
Within this broad context, this Article focuses on a new phenomenon
with far reaching implications—mandatory disclosure regimes based on
what I refer to as “targeted social transparency” (or TST). TST consists of
government administered reporting systems that require the public
disclosure of social impacts to fulfill geographically defined or issue
specific noneconomic public policy objectives, or both.4 Compared to other
forms of social transparency, TST regimes target social impacts specific to
individual countries, regions, or industries. TST has become a particularly
1
This Article uses “MNE” in reference to any firm or company with cross-border operations. As
specifically noted herein, certain observations specifically apply to publicly held, multinational
corporations, the most prevalent and prominent form of an MNE.
2
This Article defines social transparency as public reporting of “information about the products a
reporting company produces, the countries in which it does business, [and] the labor and environmental
effects of the company's operations here and abroad.” See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.5 (1999)
(defining social disclosure qua corporate social transparency). In this Article, social and environmental
impacts caused by MNEs are collectively referred to as social impacts unless otherwise indicated or
qualified.
3
See Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 256 (2010) (defining stakeholders); see also Thomas Donaldson & Lee E.
Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 65, 68–69 (1995) (identifying investors, governments, suppliers, trade associations,
employees, communities, customers, and political groups).
4
This term draws in part on research by Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil on the use of
“targeted transparency,” which they define as “public policies that . . . mandate disclosure by
corporations or other actors of standardized, comparable, and disaggregated information regarding
specific products or practices to a broad audience in order to achieve a specific public policy purpose.”
ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 37–38 (2007) (emphasis added); see also David Weil, Targeted Transparency, in
ADVANCING EXCELLENCE AND PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 77 (Cal Clark & Don-Terry Veal eds.,
2011).
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prominent (and controversial) way of addressing international human rights
through U.S. federal securities law. This Article identifies and examines
two TST regimes: (i) the “conflict minerals” provisions in § 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which
require the disclosure of minerals whose mining is associated with human
rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the Congo);5 and (ii)
enhanced disclosure requirements mandated by § 219 of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA) on companies that
engage in commercial activities associated with the Iranian government’s
suppression of human rights.6 TST’s narrow scope and relatively high
compliance costs draw attention to the following important question that is
largely missing from public debate on international business and corporate
social responsibility (CSR): How does social transparency address the
needs of MNEs and other business entities operating in the global
economy?
To answer this question, this Article presents the concept of
constructive discourse to identify ways that MNEs might benefit from TST
regimes. Drawing on the insights of constructivist political theory,
reflexive law, and the experiences of MNEs with CSR-inspired voluntary
reporting schemes, constructive discourse focuses on the relevance and use
of mandatory disclosure to the firm. Starting with the premise that MNEs
will be increasingly subject to TST, this Article focuses on how MNEs and
other firms can use the process and output of mandatory disclosure for their
own benefit through constructive discourse.7 While the specific examples
of TST in this Article address the involvement of MNEs in violations of
international human rights, these observations and arguments may also be
relevant to TST regimes in other areas such as environmental sustainability,
anticorruption, and labor.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I examines the purposes,
applications, and limitations of social transparency through U.S. federal
securities law. Part II describes the recent emergence of TST and analyzes
contemporary applications of TST with respect to the Congo and Iran. It
describes how TST is used as a means to address an indisputably important
CSR objective: the complicity of MNEs in violations of international
human rights. Part III outlines the concept of constructive discourse as a
framework for understanding TST, focusing on how MNEs can use
5
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
6
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 219, 126 Stat.
1214 (2012) [hereinafter ITRA].
7
This Article largely—but not entirely—sets aside questions about the public policy justifications
of specific TST regimes, which have been addressed by other legal scholars. See, e.g., Galit A. Sarfaty,
Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013) (analyzing the normative
implications of using securities regulation to hold firms accountable for violations of human rights).
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mandatory disclosure strategically to their benefit. Applying the concept of
constructive discourse, Part IV suggests and explores potential reforms to
current TST regimes. Finally, the Conclusion suggests potential areas for
future normative inquiry and empirical research.
II. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND THE GLOBALIZATION
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Concept of Social Transparency
Information deficits occur when a firm has information regarding its
operations—and various negative impacts and risks arising therefrom—not
otherwise available to other parties.8 Public disclosure of a firm’s activities
and impacts enhances social utility by providing investors, customers,
creditors, and counterparties (i.e., users) with information necessary to
reduce risks that they may face due to their direct or indirect interactions
with the firm. As famously stated by Louis Brandeis, “Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”9
From the perspective of firms as disclosers, the costs of disclosure are
proportionate to the amount, scope, and level of detail of information
provided to users, while the benefits of disclosure decline as the amount of
information disclosed increases.10 If private optimality converges with
social optimality, then, everything else being equal, voluntary corporate
disclosure will lead to the dissemination of all information that the public
would find beneficial.11 One important source of motivation to disclose is
reputation. A firm’s reputation is a valuable asset that is based on public
perceptions of what it does, how its acts, how it handles crises, and how
well it treats stakeholders (such as, for example, its customers and local
communities affected by its activities).12 Accordingly, firms are motivated
by desire to strengthen their legitimacy and enhance their reputation though
disclosure of information regarding their performance on a range of social
issues.13 Publicly held corporations, in particular, are driven by the social
incentives of shareholders who want firms to disclose social harms that may
8

Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 629 (2005).
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
10
See Archon Fung, Mary Graham, David Weil & Elena Fagotto, The Effectiveness of Regulatory
Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 161–62 (2006).
11
See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1343 (1999).
12
See Terry O’Callaghan, Disciplining Multinational Enterprises: The Regulatory Power of
Reputation Risk, 21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 95, 105–07 (2007) (describing the elements of corporate reputation
and its financial and nonfinancial value).
13
Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Review of Concepts, Research, and Practice, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 99–100 (2010).
9
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trigger penalties, liabilities, and future regulation.14
Aside from instrumental considerations, a firm may disclose a core
element of CSR on the basis of its commitment to transparency.15 CSR
broadens the scope of a corporation’s obligations from a single-minded
focus on maximizing its shareholders’ return to capital to a broader set of
ethical, social, and environmental considerations affecting its
stakeholders.16 Corporations may subscribe to CSR principles based on the
perceived value of certain public goods or the social utility of certain
values.17 Individual corporations have formulated and implemented social
reporting processes that include disclosure as well as accounting and
auditing of the social impacts of their activities.18
Disclosure practices based on CSR obligations are often implemented
through adoption of codes of conduct, statements of best practices, industry
guidelines, and similar nonbinding instruments.19 In the past few decades,
the CSR movement’s foundation has shifted to voluntary reporting of social
and environmental information by MNEs that exceed legal requirements.20
In particular, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), established in 1997 by
the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), has
become the leading industry standard for corporate social reporting.21
Governments have amplified the proliferation of the GRI by issuing
voluntary guidelines on CSR reporting, many of which cite, endorse, or
recommend the GRI guidelines.22 The GRI framework requires that a
participating company adopt a specific reporting format through which it
14
See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2006).
15
See Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France’s Nouvelles
Régulations Économiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 441, 452 (2004).
16
See William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits and
Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 141, 148–52 (2012).
17
See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 388–90 (2005) (concerning the environment as a
public good); Dhooge, supra note 15, at 460–61 (concerning the social utility of human rights).
18
See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 72–80 (1999) (examining social reporting conducted by The Body
Shop and Ben & Jerry’s).
19
See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges
of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 155–56, 159–61 (2004).
20
See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2005).
21
See David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 453–56 (2008)
(summarizing the history of social reporting and the background of the GRI); Galit A. Sarfaty,
Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L.
575, 590–97 (2013) (describing the emergence of the GRI as the leading standard for corporate
sustainability reporting).
22
Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 600 (referring to sustainability reporting initiatives by the Australian,
Canadian, and Japanese governments).
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makes available to the public economic, environmental, and social
information.23 As a result, thousands of MNEs in a broad array of
industries are now accustomed to participating in quasi-regulatory
initiatives based on social reporting and multistakeholder dialogues
between MNEs, civil society groups, and governments.24
Notwithstanding these factors, market competition and CSR
commitments do not provide sufficient incentives to firms to voluntarily
disclose thereby leading to the systemic underreporting of useful
information regarding the social impacts of business activities.25 The
potential loss of proprietary information; the exploitation of information
regarding an MNE’s activities by its competitors, suppliers, or customers;
and other indirect costs may discourage a socially optimal level of
disclosure.26 Firms may choose not to voluntarily disclose due to the
possibility of incurring civil liability.27 In addition, voluntary CSR
reporting is often hampered by a lack of operational utility due to vague,
undefined terms and a lack of implementation and independent monitoring
mechanisms.28 The proliferation of different reporting standards—each
with different applications, objectives, and biases—has led to legal and
policy incoherence.29 In many cases, firms are able to disclose favorable
information while concealing unfavorable information, fail to put their
disclosures in the appropriate context, or provide false disclosures while
avoiding investor backlash.30

23

See Hess, supra note 21, at 456 (summarizing the disclosure guidelines in the third edition of the

GRI).
24
See Conley & Williams, supra note 20, at 11–23 (discussing the roles of participating MNEs,
NGOs, governments, and investors); Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 597 (noting that approximately 4,000
companies issue CSR reports, one-third of which use the GRI guidelines).
25
See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1454–55 (describing why firms may lack an incentive to disclose
negative information voluntarily); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 756 (2006) (summarizing the justifications for mandatory
disclosure based on the misalignment between the private and social value of firm-specific information).
26
Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2550–51 (1997) (identifying some of the private costs of disclosure to the firm).
27
See Archon Fung, David Weil, Mary Graham & Elena Fagotto, The Political Economy of
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? 16 (Ash Inst. for Democratic Governance
and Innovation, Occasional Paper No. OP-03-04, 2004) (noting the prevalence of disclosers that
underreport or deliberately hide risks); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of
Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 483 (2007) (identifying the
substantial litigation risk that firms face from being sued by plaintiffs’ attorneys for misrepresentations
and omissions in their disclosure).
28
See Dhooge, supra note 15, at 463–64.
29
See Larry Catá Backer, Transparency Between Norm, Technique and Property in International
Law and Governance: The Example of Corporate Disclosure Regimes and Environmental Impacts, 22
MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 50–51 (2013).
30
Id. at 62–63 (describing how a firm’s ownership of data makes it difficult for outsider users to
verify or challenge CSR information disclosed by the firm); see also Hess, supra note 21, at 462–63.
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Therefore, in order to compel reporting by firms of noneconomic
social concerns, mandatory disclosure is often implemented.31 Throughout
the world, government regulators have implemented mandatory disclosure
regimes to address a wide range of social policy objectives.32 When market
participants cannot themselves obtain such information—or can only obtain
it by incurring undesirably high private transaction costs—and the
information itself can further a compelling policy objective, government
regulators may mandate disclosure.33 Several distinct factors have spurred
demand in using mandatory disclosure to compel reporting by firms of
noneconomic social concerns. The increasing scope of cross-border
business activity and growing public awareness of the social and
geopolitical impacts of global business have coincided with calls for
“shareholder democracy” through the exercise of shareholder rights by
socially responsible investors (SRIs) and other investors that take interests
in social issues.34 Civil society organizations dedicated to advancing CSR
in the areas of human rights, the environment, and other global social issues
have become increasingly sophisticated in applying pressure on MNEs.35
Many stakeholders express concerns about the effectiveness and even the
very premise of voluntary CSR-based reporting schemes.36 Instead of being
a freestanding alternative to traditional governmental regulation, advocates
believe that CSR practices should be viewed as a complement to
regulation.37
Mandatory disclosure regimes are generally premised on the
interactive effects triggered by the obligation to disclose as shown in the
31
See Cynthia Williams, Text of Remarks on Panel: “Codes of Conduct and Transparency,” 24
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 421 (2001) (suggesting that U.S. federal securities law can
address international corporate behavior through disclosure of companies’ international actions and
liability for misleading or incomplete disclosure).
32
See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 74–90 (evaluating the effectiveness of corporate
financial disclosure, restaurant hygiene quality cards, mortgage lending reporting, nutritional labeling,
toxic release reporting, workplace hazards disclosure, patient safety disclosure, and workers’
notification of plant closings).
33
See Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 156.
34
See Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and a
Universalist Concept of CSR?—A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 361, 370 (2010)
(noting the impact of socially responsible investing on motivating social performance by corporations);
Williams, supra note 2, at 1287–89 (noting the growing proportion of assets under professional
management in the United States that are invested using social screening); see also Aaron A. Dhir, The
Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47, 70–76 (2009) (arguing that social disclosure is most effective as a means of
empowering human rights-conscious shareholders).
35
See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 466–67 (2004).
36
See Conley & Williams, supra note 20, at 34–36.
37
See Gerald F. Davis, Marina V.N. Whitman & Mayer N. Zald, The Responsibility Paradox, STAN.
SOC. INNOVATION REV. at 37 (Winter 2008).
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figure below.
Figure 1. Disclosure Feedback Loop: Compelled Action and Discretionary Reaction

Distinct functions arising out of the disclosure processes can be
disaggregated and individually identified.38 Social transparency relies on
ambiguous signals by third-party users of disclosed information and
discretionary responses thereto by firms in their capacities as disclosers.39
Mandatory disclosure may enhance the ability of users of disclosed
information vis-à-vis disclosers by reducing information asymmetries
between managers and shareholders, thereby lowering agency costs that
shareholders would otherwise incur to monitor firms.40 It may improve
corporate governance by bolstering managerial discipline insofar as
corporate managers might act more diligently and honestly due to the
possibility of public scrutiny of their actions.41 Mandatory disclosure may
alter the behavior of disclosers that seek to avoid the negative reaction of
users (e.g., investors selling off securities, customers declining to buy a
product). This ex ante effect may be seen in the ways that managers might
act more diligently and honestly leading to the possibility of their actions
38

See Malloy, supra note 8, at 631–36.
Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 158.
40
Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 152 (2006).
41
Id. at 169. One increasingly prominent area in which mandatory disclosure regulation has been
applied to corporate governance is executive compensation. The Dodd-Frank Act, as part of its
disclosure-oriented reforms, requires companies to disclose certain executive compensation incentives,
comparative ratios between median employee and CEO compensation, and clawback provisions, among
other information. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 951, 953, 955, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012).
39
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being subject to public scrutiny.42
How might mandatory disclosure advance social goals?
The
application of mandatory disclosure to social transparency involves
“information forcing” rules whose purpose is to compel the sharing of
information by the actor best situated to hold or obtain such information
(i.e., the firm) to the actors most likely to use it for the public good (i.e.,
regulators and civil society).43 This information permits socially conscious
corporate outsiders—e.g., SRIs and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs)—to independently monitor and scrutinize corporations’ internal
management and decision making.44 By expressly requiring that firms
disclose specific kinds of social impacts, mandatory disclosure compels the
production of information that firms may otherwise not voluntarily provide.
Using this information, investors can more accurately account for such risks
and the market can more efficiently discount the firm’s stock price
accordingly.45
Compared to voluntary social reporting, mandatory
disclosure facilitates superior intercompany and interindustry comparisons
as well as longitudinal study of a company’s success in achieving social
objectives over time.46 Mandatory disclosure of adverse social impacts may
have a socially beneficial effect on corporate conduct if corporate managers
and boards seek to avoid moral disapprobation and act accordingly to avoid
engaging in conduct that violates social norms.47 Even if disclosed
information does not lead to any legal sanctions under U.S. federal
securities law, issuers may seek to change their behavior if they believe that
such information would lead to reputational harm or other nonlegal
sanctions.48

42

See Ripken, supra note 40, at 151; Williams, supra note 2, at 1280.
See Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict:
An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129, 139 (2011);
see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 758 (justifying mandatory disclosure as a means to
reduce search costs incurred by outsiders to obtain firm-specific information).
44
Larry Catá Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project:
The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 37, 77 (2011).
45
Williams, supra note 2, at 1279–80.
46
See Hess, supra note 18, at 67; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680 (1984) (observing that the value of
mandatory disclosure lies in its ability to reduce informational costs by controlling the time, place, and
manner in which firms disclose information to investors).
47
David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1857 (2001).
48
See Williams, supra note 35, at 495–96 (citing the expressive function of law and the ways that
nonlegal mechanisms can enforce and enhance firm compliance).
43
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B. Securities Regulation and Social Transparency
1. The Scope of Mandatory Disclosure Under U.S. Securities Law
One of the world’s most prominent and far reaching mandatory
disclosure regimes is found in U.S. federal securities law.49 Its scope—
covering many of the largest and most prominent U.S. and foreign MNEs in
the world—arguably makes it the single most influential and
comprehensive type of business regulation.50 Mandatory disclosure is the
core organizing principle of U.S. federal securities law.51 U.S. federal
securities law embraces a “market discipline” approach, which seeks to
ensure that corporate issuers disclose sufficient information so that
investors can make their own decisions.52
Mandatory disclosure under U.S. federal securities law is generally
governed by the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).53 The Securities Act
governs the disclosure requirements related to the issuance of securities in
primary markets, primarily by requiring firms that wish to sell securities in
the U.S. market to register with the SEC through the submission of a
publicly available registration statement.54 The Exchange Act governs the
trading of securities in secondary markets and imposes ongoing disclosure
requirements on companies through the filing of periodic reports with the
SEC that are made available to the public.55 Both registration statements
49
See Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 167, 169 (characterizing corporate financial
disclosure as an example of a highly effective transparency system); see also David Hess, Social
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability
Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 461 (2007).
50
Foreign companies that sell securities in the U.S. markets are subject to disclosure requirements
under U.S. federal securities law generally equivalent to U.S.-based issuers, notwithstanding the fact
that such foreign companies may not be subject to other U.S. laws. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight
on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities
Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 18 (2011).
51
See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 605–
06 (2013).
52
U.S. federal securities law operates in conjunction with state “blue-sky” securities laws, which, in
contrast, are “merit-based”—i.e., they provide state-level government regulators with the authority to
judge the soundness of securities. Although state blue-sky securities laws still apply to many types of
securities transactions, their scope has been significantly curtailed. Westbrook, supra note 50, at 18
n.17 (citing and referring to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b)(1)(A)).
53
See Williams, supra note 2, at 1209–35 (summarizing the legislative context and history of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
54
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2009).
55
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012). Exchange Act reporting requirements
apply to any company that has at least 500 shareholders and $10 million in assets, has made a registered
public offering of securities in the United States, or has listed securities on a U.S. stock exchange
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under the Securities Act and periodic reports under the Exchange Act must
include extensive information regarding an issuer’s management, risks,
operations, and financial condition, among other information.56 Moreover,
the Exchange Act includes powerful antifraud provisions that impose
standards on the veracity and completeness of mandatory disclosure. Most
notably among them is § 10(b), which subjects an Exchange Act reporting
company to civil liability for material omissions or misrepresentations in
periodic reports filed with the SEC or any other document or information
released by the company.57 Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b), is one
of the foundations of the disclosure-based regulatory approach of U.S.
federal securities law.58 Another source of liability is § 18(a), which
establishes an express private cause of action against any person that makes
a false and misleading filing.59
Until recently, social transparency has been very limited in U.S.
federal securities law. Historically, disclosure of the adverse social impacts
of a company’s activities was required only where such disclosure would be
necessary to protect investors’ financial interests.
The mandatory
disclosure obligation under U.S. federal securities law is circumscribed by
the principle of materiality. Under this principle, a company must only
disclose a given piece of information if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable investor would deem it significant in the “total mix” of
available information—i.e., what an ordinary, rational investor would

(hereinafter an Exchange Act reporting company). See id. §§ 12(a), 12(g)(1), 13(a), 15(d).
56
The broad, open-ended scope of the periodic reporting requirements under § 13 of the Exchange
Act have proven to be fertile ground for TST as described later in this Article. See infra Part II.B.
57
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act requires that a plaintiff prove that a defendant made a material
omission or misrepresentation connected with the purchase or sale of a security with scienter causing
economic loss to the plaintiff due to reliance on that omission or misrepresentation. See Exchange Act §
10(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2010)).
58
Rule 10b-5 provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (emphasis added).
59
Under § 18(a), a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she purchased the securities in reliance on a
false or misleading filing and suffered damages directly as a result. Further, a defendant is not liable for
any false or misleading statement in a filed document if the defendant can establish that it acted in good
faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or misleading. See Exchange Act § 18(a)
(codified at 15 U.S.C § 78r(a) (2010)).
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consider important information in an arm’s length securities transaction.60
Consequently, under this principle, companies are only required to disclose
those social impacts that constitute a material business risk to the company
itself.61
Regulation S-K, which specifies what information Exchange Act
reporting companies must disclose in their periodic filings to the SEC,
reflects this risk-oriented approach to disclosure.62 Regulation S-K requires
companies to disclose in their annual, quarterly, and other periodic reports
certain risks including, inter alia, (i) material costs and other effects of
compliance with law, including “any risks attendant to [their] foreign
operations”;63 (ii) material pending legal proceedings;64 and (iii)
management’s discussion of material trends, events, and uncertainties that
are reasonably expected to have material effects on its operations, liquidity,
or capital resources.65
In 2010, the SEC issued an interpretive release that clarified the
applicability of securities disclosure requirements to climate change risks.66
The SEC’s guidance applied the principle of materiality by affirming that
Exchange Act reporting companies are required to disclose climate change
impacts and risks only to the extent that there is a clear and quantitatively
material effect on the company's business.67 The SEC has eschewed brightline disclosure requirements in respect to social and environmental risks in
favor of permitting companies to avoid disclosing such impacts on the basis
that their costs are relatively small, ambiguous, or both.68 This narrow
approach has been criticized for failing to address the range of social
concerns that do not meet the materiality requirement and for disregarding
circumstances in which social concerns may later become economic
concerns.69 While the SEC continues to evaluate the implementation of a
generalized social transparency regime under U.S. federal securities law, its
realization remains far from imminent.70

60
See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Westbrook, supra note 50,
at 26–27; Williams, supra note 2, at 1208–09.
61
See Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental Regulation: Some
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 247, 352–53 (2002).
62
Regulation S-K consists of administrative rules adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1982. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2010).
63
Id. § 229.101(d)(3); § 229.101 (Item 101).
64
Id. § 229.103 (Item 103).
65
Id. § 229.303 (Item 303).
66
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release
No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
67
See Westbrook, supra note 50, at 44–55.
68
See id. at 59.
69
See id. at 70–71, 74.
70
See Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 602–03.
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2. Shortcomings of Social Transparency Under U.S. Securities
Law
The effectiveness of social transparency is hampered by a range of
factors endemic to mandatory disclosure regulation. As described below,
social transparency regimes based on mandatory disclosure may fall short
of their objectives due to (i) weak compliance effects on disclosers, (ii)
inconsistent informational value to users, and (iii) uncertain or even
perverse incentives on disclosers.
First, mandatory disclosure may not sufficiently deter misconduct or
incentivize virtuous behavior by firms. Since social transparency does not
enforce substantive standards of behavior per se, its ability to positively
affect business behavior depends on the capacity and willingness of the
public to use and respond to disclosed information.71 Therefore, the impact
of social transparency relies on the ability of users of disclosed information
to affect the interests of firms and the ability of firms to detect changes in
user behavior.72 However, disclosure in itself may not sufficiently persuade
them of the need to change their modus operandi.73 Ambiguous disclosure
rules permit companies to engage in strategic noncompliance by disputing
the applicability of a disclosure obligation and refusing to comply.74
Notwithstanding the prospect of civil enforcement, social transparency
is arguably predicated on a moral community in which members share
common values such that firms bear the reputational effects of disclosed
information on the adverse social impacts of their activities.75 This may
pose a particular problem in respect to the activities of MNEs operating in
global, multicultural business environments where there may not be
universally held social values.76 If MNEs have weak ties to a community
and stakeholders do not have the capacity to react to disclosed information
in the form of a social demand, then the deterrence value of any perceived
71
See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1315, 1344 (2012).
72
Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 164–65 (describing how mandatory disclosure
regulation can incentivize disclosers to change their decision making based on the responses of users to
disclosed information).
73
For example, the “adopt-or-disclose” approach of many of the corporate governance reforms
enacted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act merely gives corporations the option either to comply with a
substantive rule or disclose their noncompliance. Ripken, supra note 40, at 144. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
74
Malloy, supra note 8, at 625.
75
See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 380 (1999) (noting the role of punishment as
an expression of a community’s values).
76
See Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 51, 77–78
(2010) (observing that the effectiveness of shaming as a means of enforcing international human rights
norms depends on the existence of a social context that will enable the shame to occur).
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moral disapproval might be commensurately weak.77 The weaknesses of
social sanctions may similarly apply to investors, who may be insulated
from their effects.78
Second, the ability of mandatory disclosure to ensure a socially
optimal level of regulation is premised on the veracity of the efficient
market hypothesis, which assumes that investors are fully rational and make
collectively optimal decisions.79 However, on a collective level, investors
may not be able to influence corporations’ behavior due to collective action
problems.80 Likewise, on an individual level, the analytical and structural
problems that often impair investors’ ability to use disclosed information
have been the subject of considerable scholarly attention.81 The intended
beneficiaries of mandatory disclosure may be impaired, inter alia, by
information overload, overconfidence, overoptimistic outlooks, and
confirmation bias, all of which may affect both sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors alike.82 Indeed, even investors that are aware of
such biases nonetheless find it difficult to undo such biasing influences.83
The disclosure of analytically complex transactions presents particularly
vexing
cognitive
problems
resulting
in
oversimplification,
incomprehensibility, and ambiguity.84 Further, the logistical complexity of
organizing, sorting, and comparing enormous amounts of disclosed
information may hamper the investors’ ability to utilize information that
they are otherwise capable of assessing.85 Depending on the nature of the
77
See Hope M. Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate
“Greenwashing” or a Corporate Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 46 (2010).
However, the effectiveness of reputational sanctions in respect of social impacts such as international
human rights may arguably be greater due to the tangible effects of corporate harms on vulnerable
individuals and groups. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 204–05 (1998) (arguing that norms involving
prevention of bodily harm for vulnerable groups are more influential); Kevin T. Jackson, The Normative
Logic of Global Economic Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental Justification for the Rule of Law
and Human Rights, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 71, 125 (2013) (referring to the reputational ramifications of
corporate malfeasance connected with basic human rights as “moral felonies”).
78
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
798–99 (2005) (noting the insulation of corporate shareholders caused by their lack of information about
the effects of a corporation's negative conduct on society).
79
Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 1059, 1065 (2011).
80
See Elhauge, supra note 78, at 799 (arguing that dispersed public shareholders do not act on moral
or social norms even if individual shareholders believe they are important). But see Ribstein, supra note
14, at 1449–50 (challenging Elhauge’s assumption that shareholders will disregard social incentives).
81
See Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 158.
82
See Ripken, supra note 40, at 160–76, 181–82.
83
Prentice, supra note 79, at 1080.
84
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–17 (2004).
85
See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative
Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 55–56 (2010). But see Davidoff & Hill,
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adverse social impacts at issue, social transparency regimes may be
similarly hindered by these cognitive shortcomings.
Third, mandatory disclosure may fail due to perverse or otherwise less
socially desirable incentives to disclosers. Absent a fiduciary obligation
above and beyond disclosure, the very act of disclosing may free corporate
agents to act in even more self-interested ways by allowing them to
rationalize their behavior as morally justified.86 Similarly, firms may
satisfy disclosure requirements while seeking to minimize changes in their
substantive behavior.87 A related concern arises from the possibility that
unwanted conduct deterred by mandatory disclosure may lead to the worst
of unintended consequences: a shift to even less desirable conduct.88 A
regulatory focus on one set of risks may create incentives for companies to
shift their behavior towards other equally or more risky practices, or other
jurisdictions that are not regulated by mandatory disclosure.89
III. TARGETED SOCIAL TRANSPARENCY AS A
REGULATORY TECHNIQUE
A. The Emergence of TST
A new genus of social transparency has recently emerged. Targeted
social transparency, or TST, consists of mandatory disclosure regulation
that is crafted for the purpose of addressing noneconomic public policy
objectives specific to individual countries, regions, or industries. TST
represents both an evolution of social transparency as well as a major
departure from generalized, broad-based social transparency regimes. In
comparison to other forms of social transparency, TST’s use of sharply
focused disclosure requirements permits legislators and regulators to use
disclosure for narrowly defined ends. Unlike Regulation S-K and other
reporting requirements under U.S. federal securities law, TST regimes
address narrowly defined social objectives through mandatory disclosure of
specific nonfinancial information for the benefit of a range of noninvestor
stakeholders. In contrast to the materiality standard governing Regulation
S-K, mandatory disclosure under TST is triggered by explicit statutory and
supra note 51, at 628–29 (asserting that securities disclosure provides sufficient notice to sophisticated
investors).
86
See Prentice, supra note 79, at 1101–02.
87
David Weil, Mary Graham & Archon Fung, Targeting Transparency, 340 SCIENCE 1410, 1411
(2013).
88
Manne, supra note 27, at 485–86.
89
See Weil, Graham & Fung, supra note 87, at 1411. The potential for this kind of risk-shifting
behavior is a potential problem in respect of TST. See infra text accompanying note 146 (citing
concerns that conflict minerals disclosure might simply incentivize MNEs to source these goods from
other non-TST regulated jurisdictions).
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regulatory requirements that are themselves based on social objectives.
The emergence of TST reflects the convergence of several interrelated
factors in global governance, CSR, and financial regulation.90 First, crossborder financial activity, international trade, and foreign direct investment
have led to a growing awareness of the powerful role of corporations as
global actors.91 However, governments and MNEs have largely rejected the
implementation of substantive requirements on global corporate conduct
through international legal instruments. The failure of the UN Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights exemplifies the lack of consensus
on the legal obligations of private nonstate actors.92 Private rights of action
against MNEs in domestic courts for violations of human rights,
environmental, and labor standards are relatively narrow and limited.93 As
the need for cross-border governance increases while international legal
reform remains stagnant, social transparency regimes provide an appealing
means of addressing global problems.94
Second, TST also seeks to address the shortcomings of the New
Governance model of regulation exemplified by the GRI and other
voluntary reporting schemes. New Governance regulation emerged as a
counterpoint to traditional top-down, command and control regulation
dictated by government agencies.95 Regulatory schemes based on New
Governance principles adopt a participatory approach that embraces
flexibility, experimentalism, localism, and reflective self-regulation.96 New
Governance-based securities regulation features communication
mechanisms between regulators and firms to promote industry-based
90
A thorough descriptive analysis of the historical antecedents to TST is beyond the scope of this
Article. Nevertheless, the following discussion identifies and briefly explores the political and
economic circumstances that have enabled the recent emergence of TST regimes.
91
See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 461–65 (2001) (outlining the growing need and difficulty of attaching human rights
responsibility on corporations).
92
See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th
Sess., Aug. 26, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter UN Norms]; see also
Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005) (analyzing the shift in how international law regulates private
corporations marked by the UN norms).
93
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013),
substantially reduced the scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) by excluding cases involving purely
extraterritorial conduct. The ATS, which allows U.S. district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations,” has been a highly celebrated (or much
decried) jurisdictional basis for foreign plaintiffs to seek redress against multinational corporations for
violations of international human rights law committed in foreign countries. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
94
FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 128.
95
Dhir, supra note 34, at 58.
96
See Hess, supra note 49, at 454–55.
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learning within broad policy guidelines and regulatory goals.97
However, strategic behavior by MNEs has led to growing
dissatisfaction with the GRI and similar corporate reporting schemes.98
Social reporting, without regulatory oversight and enforcement, becomes a
ritualistic practice that fails to meaningfully change firm behavior.99 The
threat of state regulation is often an insufficient means of compelling
adherence with CSR norms.100 This has spurred commentators to propose
external monitoring schemes that assess and enforce implementation of
New Governance principles.101 TST, in this important respect, constitutes a
huge step forward. By expressly and explicitly adopting social objectives
within the mandatory disclosure framework of U.S. federal securities law,
TST imposes greater control on the content and format of disclosed
information in order to ensure that it addresses public goals.102 TST
regimes enforce an affirmative obligation to disclose with the threat of
antifraud liability under the Exchange Act.103
97
See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation,
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2008). Along similar lines, mandatory disclosure embraces the concept of
“regulation by information” by requiring MNEs to produce information that they can use to review,
benchmark, and improve their own social performance. See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at
130; see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 186–88, 193 (2004) (describing
regulation by information as governance premised on governments providing information to let
individuals regulate themselves).
98
See Chiu, supra note 34, at 376–92 (arguing that standardization and convergence in CSR
reporting have led to weak and uncritical market-based governance); Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in
Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 67, 136–37 (2011) (noting how competition between private governance schemes for corporate
participants frequently leads to lower minimum standards).
99
See Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 608 (characterizing voluntary CSR reporting as “transparency for its
own sake rather than actual improvements in behavior”); Wendy E. Wagner, Imagining Corporate
Sustainability as a Public Good Rather Than a Corporate Bad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 567
(2011) (noting how a good score in the GRI may become an end in itself); Williams, supra note 35, at
501 (cautioning against disclosure as an end in itself).
100
Cf. Thomas Risse, Governance Under Limited Sovereignty, in BACK TO BASICS: STATE POWER
IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD 93 (Martha Finnemore & Judith Goldstein eds., 2013) (noting the
voluntary implementation of CSR practices by MNEs).
101
See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 431–32 (2005) (proposing that governments promote oversight of
MNEs’ compliance with voluntary codes of conduct through the licensing of nongovernmental
monitors); Ratner, supra note 91, at 533 (referring to efforts by NGOs and labor unions to include
procedures for independent monitoring of corporate codes of conduct).
102
See Hess, supra note 21, at 467–68 (proposing mandatory social reporting to reduce strategic
reporting by MNEs); Shane M. Shelley, Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social Responsibility, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 107, 128–29 (2006) (arguing that mandatory disclosure of CSR impacts reduces the
“gaming” of social responsibility performance).
103
See Rachel Cherington, Securities Laws and Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward an
Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1439, 1464 (2004) (observing that in the
absence of an express obligation to disclose social and environmental activities under U.S. federal
securities law, corporations can simply choose not to disclose information about their overseas
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Finally, TST reflects the appeal of extraterritorial regulation.
Traditionally, U.S. federal securities law was based on the presumption that
a country’s laws apply only to acts or events occurring within its
territory.104 Increasingly, domestic law has been extended to regulate
conduct outside of the United States notwithstanding recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that have limited extraterritoriality.105 U.S. federal
securities law has been at the forefront of this phenomenon. Perhaps the
most prominent application of extraterritorial regulation in U.S. federal
securities law is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which imposes
civil liability and criminal sanctions on U.S. persons as well as foreign
Exchange Act reporting companies for bribery of foreign government
officials even when such acts occurred offshore.106 Similarly, the DoddFrank Act applies extraterritorial regulation in a range of areas.107
B. Examples of TST in U.S. Federal Securities Law
Although nascent in its current form, the implications of TST are
already the subject of intense debate. U.S. federal securities law has begun
embracing TST as a means of furthering foreign policy objectives in the
area of international human rights. The following discussion examines two
contrasting examples of TST in U.S. federal securities law to date: (i)
“conflict minerals” reporting under § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and (ii)
enhanced Iran-related reporting requirements mandated by § 219 of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.
operations in order to avoid Rule 10b-5 liability).
104
See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE
21ST CENTURY 33–35 (2012); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(acknowledging the presumption against extraterritoriality as a principle of statutory interpretation).
105
See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV.
815, 846–49 (2009) (citing the use of extraterritoriality in antitrust, securities regulation, various areas
of intellectual property law, corporate law, bankruptcy, tax criminal law, environmental law, civil rights,
and labor law). In 2010, the Supreme Court rejected the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5 in socalled “f-cubed” lawsuits—i.e., securities fraud claims against foreign defendants by foreign plaintiffs
who bought their securities outside the United States. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct.
2869 (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act subsequently reaffirmed federal jurisdiction over such Rule 10b-5
suits brought by the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
106
See Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2
(2006)); see also Woody, supra note 71, at 1342–43 (comparing the FCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act).
107
See Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market
in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1330–35 (2014) (describing the assertion of broad
extraterritorial regulatory authority by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in respect
of swaps activities); Stephen Kim Park, Guarding the Guardians: The Case for Regulating State-Owned
Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 771–76 (2014) (examining the CFTC’s
extraterritorial regulation of swaps specifically in respect of international financial institutions and other
state-owned financial entities).
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1. Conflict Minerals Disclosure Under the Dodd-Frank Act
The “conflict minerals” provisions in § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act
(DFA § 1502) require Exchange Act reporting companies to disclose to the
SEC their internal measures to exercise due diligence and chain of custody
of minerals mined in the Congo or adjacent countries which have
historically been linked to civil strife, human rights abuses, and violence.108
The overarching purpose of DFA § 1502 is evident in its prologue, which
expressly states that it is intended to address “the exploitation and trade of
conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [that
are used to help] finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of
violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly
sexual- and gender-based violence, [that contribute] to an emergency
humanitarian situation therein . . . .”109 The human rights impact of conflict
minerals directly and indirectly involves business. For example, local
mining companies and their security providers are directly involved in
human rights abuses such as forced labor.110 Further, an array of
companies—both locally based and MNEs—that buy, trade, transport,
process, and finance the purchase of conflict minerals may fund and thereby
perpetuate the conflict in the Congo.111 DFA § 1502 seeks to restrict
funding sources for armed groups in the Congo through the dissemination
of information about the connection between their commercial activity and
human rights violations.112
Under DFA § 1502, an Exchange Act reporting company must
disclose in a new specialized disclosure report filed with the SEC whether
any conflict minerals that are “necessary to the functionality or production
of a product manufactured by such [company]” originated in the Congo or
any country that shares an internationally recognized border with the Congo
(i.e., Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia).113 It designates columbite-tantalite
(coltan), cassiterite, gold, or wolframite (or any of their respective
108

Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(b) (amending § 13 by adding a new subsection (p)).
Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(a).
110
See Laura E. Seay, What's Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian
Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working
Paper No. 284, 2012), available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1425843_file_Seay_
Dodd_Frank_FINAL.pdf.
111
Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 43, at 131–33.
112
See id. at 134, 137–38; see also Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,276 (Sept.
12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249B) (citing statement of Senator Russ Feingold, one of its
cosponsors).
113
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)(1)(A), (2); see also Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,280
(describing a new SEC form for such disclosure, Form SD).
109
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derivatives) as conflict minerals if sourced from the Congo or contiguous
countries.114 These minerals are typically acquired by MNEs indirectly
through intermediaries for use in manufacturing a wide range of products—
most notably consumer electronics.115 If an Exchange Act reporting
company determines that it uses one or more minerals designated by DFA
§ 1502 either to manufacture a product or any such mineral is contained in a
company manufactured product itself, then it must comply with DFA
§ 1502.116 There is no exception for de minimis use of conflict minerals nor
grandfathering for any companies, products, or industries.117
Most
importantly, disclosure under DFA § 1502 is not subject to the materiality
standard.118
If an Exchange Act reporting company determines that it uses one or
more conflict minerals, it must follow a multistep disclosure and due
diligence process. First, the company must conduct a reasonable country of
origin inquiry into their source of origin.119 Upon completing this inquiry,
if the company has determined that it uses conflict minerals, it must
(i) exercise due diligence on “the source and chain of custody” of the
conflict minerals, and (ii) arrange an independent private sector audit on the
source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals through its supply
chain and disclose a summary of the results thereof.120 On the basis of
these additional measures, as applicable, the company must disclose
whether or not it uses conflict minerals and describe the measures that it has
taken on Form SD.121

114
Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(e)(4)(A). These minerals are commonly referred to as “3TG” (tin,
tantalum, tungsten, and gold) in the mining industry.
115
See Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 105, 107 (2012).
116
In addition, there is an exception for a company that uses conflict minerals from recycled and
scrap sources even if they were originally sourced from the Congo. See Conflict Minerals Final Rule,
77 Fed. Reg. at 56,332 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2012)).
117
Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,298 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b
(2012)) (declining to include a de minimis exception through SEC rulemaking).
118
See Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,960 (Dec. 23, 2010) (stating that
nature and purpose of DFA § 1502 is “qualitatively different from the nature and purpose of the
disclosure of information that has been required under the periodic reporting provisions of the Exchange
Act”); see also Woody, supra note 71, at 1340–42 (criticizing the absence of a materiality requirement
in DFA Section 1502).
119
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
120
Id.
121
In addition to filing Form SD, the company must attach a separate, more detailed Conflict
Minerals Report as an exhibit to Form SD. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,302
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2012)). The Conflict Minerals Report must include “a description
of the measures taken by the person to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such
[conflict] minerals, which measures shall include an independent private sector audit of such report.” 15
U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i).
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2. Human Rights Disclosure Under the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act
Another example of SEC mandatory disclosure expressly justified by
human rights objectives is found in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA). ITRA builds upon a series of U.S.
laws and executive orders that impose sanctions against Iran.122 The U.S.
sanctions regime against Iran has been motivated by a variety of concerns
over the Iranian government’s nuclear program and proliferation thereof,
support for international terrorist organizations, and human rights abuses.
ITRA, in particular, implements a range of new measures relating to
human rights abuses in Iran.123 Such measures include the following: (i)
requiring the President to report on the inclusion of Iranian political leaders
as human rights abusers subject to sanctions;124 (ii) imposition of sanctions
on persons that knowingly provide Iran, the Iranian government, or for use
in Iran, any goods or technologies likely to be used to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran (e.g., firearms and
ammunition, rubber bullets, chemical sprays, electroshock weapons, and
surveillance technology);125 and (iii) imposition of sanctions against
persons who engage in censorship or assist others in the impairment of
freedom of expression in Iran.126
Within this broad mandate, § 219 of ITRA (ITRA § 219) imposes new
reporting requirements on Exchange Act reporting companies to assist the
U.S. government in executing ITRA’s human rights-based sanctions.127
ITRA § 219 amends § 13 of the Exchange Act by requiring Exchange Act
reporting companies to disclose any information concerning, inter alia,
their assistance in the transfer of goods or technologies, or the provision of
services, that are likely to be used by the Iranian government to commit
serious human rights abuses.128 If an Exchange Act reporting company has
“knowingly engaged” in such activity, then it must include in its quarterly
122
See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) of 2010, Pub. L. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010). In addition, regulations promulgated by
the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) restrict trade, investment, and
financial activities with Iran by U.S. persons. See Westbrook, supra note 50, at 47–50.
123
See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, §§ 401–
403, 411–415, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012).
124
Id. § 401 (amending § 105 of CISADA).
125
Id. § 402 (adding a new § 105A to CISADA).
126
Id. § 403 (adding a new § 105B to CISADA).
127
ITRA § 219 went into effect on February 6, 2013. See id. § 219(b) (amending § 13 by adding a
new subsection (r)); see also SEC, Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, Section 147, Section
13(r), Questions 147.01 and 147.02 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
guidance/exchangeactsections-interps.htm.
128
15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(1)(C)).
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or annual filing to the SEC information concerning the nature and extent of
the activity, any gross revenues and net profits attributable to the activity,
and whether it or any affiliate intends to continue the activity.129 Like DFA
§ 1502, there is no de minimis exception to ITRA § 219 disclosure
requirements.130 Further, an Exchange Act reporting company must
concurrently file a separate notice of disclosure with the SEC, which upon
receipt by the SEC shall be transmitted to the President and Congress.131
The President is required to initiate an investigation to determine within
180 days whether sanctions should be imposed on the Exchange Act
reporting company (or its affiliate) on the basis of the ITRA § 219
disclosure.132
3. Comparing and Contrasting Approaches to TST
DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 constitute two examples of TST under
U.S. federal securities law currently in effect.133 Other applications of TST
follow similar approaches. Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
counterpart to DFA § 1502, requires oil, gas, and mining companies to
disclose certain payments made to governments for the commercial
development of natural resources.134 Its status remains uncertain.135 A TST
regime targeted at North Korea and modeled on ITRA § 219 is pending in
Congress.136 Other countries have recently enacted, or are considering
129

Id. § 78m(r)(2).
See Brian Breheny, Section 13(r) Disclosure Guidance for Public Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/21/
section-13r-disclosure-guidance-for-public-companies.
131
15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(4).
132
Id. § 78m(r)(5).
133
Three industry associations—the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—challenged the SEC’s implementation of DFA § 1502. On April 14, 2014,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Conflict Minerals Final Rule with the
exception of the requirement that issuers state in the Exchange Act filings and on their websites that their
products are “DRC conflict free,” “not been found to be DRC conflict free,” or “DRC conflict
undeterminable.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by Am.
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Following this decision, the SEC affirmed that Exchange
Act reporting companies were required to meet the initial June 2, 2014 deadline for all other DFA § 1502
disclosure requirements. See Keith F. Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals
Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/
Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994#.U9wfjyjBEgo.
134
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1504,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Section 1504 complements the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), a voluntary stakeholder initiative that combats corruption by providing disclosure that enables
comparison of what extractive companies pay governments with what governments say they receive.
135
In 2013, a U.S. federal court decision vacated SEC Rule 13q-1, which implemented § 1504’s
disclosure requirements. See Am. Petrol. Inst. v. Oxfam Am., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
136
The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2014, which was passed by the House of
Representatives on July 28, 2014, seeks to strengthen financial sanctions against the government of
130
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enacting, social transparency regimes under domestic securities law
comparable to DFA § 1502.137
DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 raise a number of issues regarding the
scope and purposes of TST. The following figure identifies the major
differences between these two TST regimes:
Figure 2. Comparison of DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219
DFA § 1502

ITRA § 219

Human rights abuses
associated with conflict
minerals trade and civil
conflict in the Congo

Scope

Human rights abuses by
Iranian government; plus
Iran’s energy sector,
WMDs and other military
capabilities, support for
terrorism, money
laundering

End involvement of armed
groups in Congo-based
conflict minerals
commercial activity

Objectives

Expand and strengthen
U.S. economic sanctions
against Iran

North Korea. It targets firms, foreign governments, other entities, and individuals involved in human
rights abuses committed by the North Korean government as well as the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, money laundering and other illicit activities, sponsorship of international terrorism,
censorship, and other sanctioned activities. See North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2014, H.R.
1771, 113th Cong. §§ 2, 101(a) (2014). Similar to ITRA § 219, it imposes new disclosure requirements
under the Exchange Act that would require an Exchange Act reporting company to disclose its
involvement in any sanctioned activity in its annual or quarterly report filed with the SEC. Id. § 302(a)
(amending § 13 of the Exchange Act by adding a new subsection (s)).
137
See Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 108 (describing legislation in Canada and the EU). In March 2014, the
European Commission released a proposed framework for conflict minerals regulation. See European
Commission, Proposal For a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Setting Up a Union
System for Supply Chain Due Diligence Self-certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and
Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating in Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas, 2014/0059 (COD) (Mar.
5, 2014), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/ march/tradoc_152227.pdf; see also Karel De
Gucht, European Commission, Ensuring Minerals From Conflict Zones Are Sourced Responsibly,
STATEMENT/14/50 (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT14-50_en.htm (announcing the European Commission’s proposed regulation).
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Use of conflict minerals
“necessary to the
functionality or production
of a product
manufactured”

Disclosure on Form SD
(and Conflict Minerals
Report); country of origin
inquiry; supply chain due
diligence

Exchange Act liability for
disclosure violations

Trigger

“Knowingly engaged” in
sanctioned activity

Requirements

Disclosure in SEC
periodic reporting; filing
of separate notice of
disclosure with SEC

Penalties

Exchange Act liability for
disclosure violations;
potential imposition of
sanctions against company

Both TST regimes cover a broad range of activities and entities.
Neither DFA § 1502 nor ITRA § 219 includes a materiality threshold for
triggering mandatory reporting.138 MNEs are subject to potential liability
under the Exchange Act for any false or misleading information.139 Neither
regime establishes a bright-line rule that distinguishes domestic issuers
from foreign private issuers—both domestic and foreign MNEs are subject
to their respective disclosure requirements.140 Comparable to supply-chain
reporting required by DFA § 1502, ITRA § 219 requires Exchange Act
reporting companies to disclose activities of any affiliate, which may
include transactions and dealings with foreign customers, clients, vendors,
138
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(2)(B) (providing that a company subject to ITRA § 219 shall disclose a
detailed description of “the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity”) (emphasis
added).
139
See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,304 n.342 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 240, 249B) (noting that issuers are subject to potential liability under §§ 10(b), 13(a) and (p),
15(d), and 18(a) of the Exchange Act as well as Rule 10b-5); see also text accompanying notes 57–59
(summarizing disclosure-related Exchange Act liability). Importantly, however, liability is still
conditioned on the materiality requirements in these antifraud provisions. For example, under Rule 10b5, a plaintiff may only sue an Exchange Act reporting company for misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in its DFA § 1502 disclosure documents. See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at
56,304 n.342.
140
See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,287 (declining to exempt foreign private
issuers from DFA § 1502); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(1) (applying ITRA § 219 to all issuers).
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and counterparties and the activities of corporate directors and senior
executives.141 Consequently, ITRA § 219 compels MNEs to provide
disclosures regarding the activities of non-U.S. affiliates that are organized
under the laws of non-U.S. jurisdictions. In many of these non-U.S.
jurisdictions, it is legal to do business in Iran and to do business with the
Iranian government.142
Compliance with both TST regimes imposes significant costs on firms.
Their respective disclosure requirements involve various functions within
MNEs, including legal counsel, financial reporting, audit and accounting,
supply-chain management and procurement, manufacturing quality control,
and public relations.143 Related compliance costs—which may include
supply-chain due diligence, third-party verification, external private audits,
traceability schemes, and sourcing mechanisms—require external
expenditures.144 Aside from these direct costs, it is plausible that the
information disclosed by MNEs regarding their use of conflict minerals
may impose a variety of indirect costs.145 Due to these costs, some
observers have argued that TST regimes may simply divert MNEs to other
regulatory jurisdictions and host countries that do not have comparable
social transparency rules.146
DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 differ in several significant ways. Most
importantly, DFA § 1502 is solely dedicated to advancing international
human rights whereas the human rights goals of ITRA § 219 are
141
Under Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act, an “affiliate” of a company is a person who directly (or
indirectly through one or more intermediaries) controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
with such company. The term “control” is defined as the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract,
or otherwise. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2.
142
See Ben DiPietro, Iran Sanctions Law Reporting Causing Confusion, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION
CURRENTS BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 1:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/02/20/iransanctions-law-reporting-causing-confusion.
143
See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. &. TECH. L. 327, 335–36 (2011) (describing
the range of DFA § 1502 compliance costs).
144
Woody, supra note 71, at 1332–33; see also Edward Wyatt, Use of ‘Conflict Minerals’ Gets
More Scrutiny From U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at B1 (noting compliance costs ranging from $71
million estimated by the SEC to $9–$16 billion estimated by the National Association of
Manufacturers).
145
See Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations
Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis,
25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 392 (2013) (citing the cost to shareholders resulting from DFA § 1502’s
effects on management and customer decision making); see also Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 43, at
146–47 (noting concerns about potential litigation under the ATS, complaints before National Contact
Point bodies, targeted UN sanctions, and consumer boycotts).
146
Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 112–13 (noting that mandatory disclosure may force companies to
withdraw from the U.S. capital markets); Woody, supra note 71, at 1345–46 (arguing that DFA § 1502
may lead to a de facto embargo of all minerals from the Congo damaging the Congolese economy in the
process).
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intermingled with other nonsocial policy objectives of the U.S. sanctions
regime against Iran.147 Reflecting this divergence, ITRA § 219 imposes
penalties on MNEs that comply with its disclosure requirements—i.e., the
possibility of being subject to sanctions after investigation by the
President). Further, unlike the stand-alone DFA § 1502, ITRA § 219 is
accompanied by other nonmandatory SEC programs to address corporate
complicity with state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.148
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE AND CORPORATE
STRATEGY
A. The Integrative and Expressive Dimensions of Constructive
Discourse
The broad mandate of TST and the limitations of mandatory disclosure
pose particularly unique challenges.149 In comparison to mandatory
disclosure of economic and financial information under U.S. federal
securities law, TST broadens the de facto audience for disclosed
information beyond investors to all stakeholders. Moreover, in comparison
to Regulation S-K and other generalized social transparency regimes, TST's
disclosure requirements are more focused, exhaustive, and arguably
contentious.
In light of concerns about the effectiveness and costs of mandatory
disclosure, this Article presents the concept of constructive discourse.
Drawing from constructivist approaches to public international law,
applications of reflexive law, and the experiences of voluntary CSR
reporting schemes referenced in the following discussion, constructive
discourse helps conceptualize the ways in which MNEs use the process of
complying with disclosure and disclosed information to recognize and
respond to TST's geographically defined or issue-specific public policy
objectives. The term “constructive discourse” reveals its dual conceptual
foundations: (i) constructivism, originally formulated in political science
and subsequently applied to legal rules and institutions, which focuses on
the role of norms in shaping behavior; and (ii) discourse-based theories of
international law and international relations theory, which emphasize the

147
ITRA § 219 also requires disclosure of transactions and dealings relating to Iran’s investment in
the petroleum and petrochemical sectors, development of weapons of mass destruction, or sponsorship
of international terrorism. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(r)(A), (B), and (D).
148
See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly
Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1217–21 (2010) (describing the
accomplishments and failures of the SEC’s Office of Global Security Risk).
149
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 51, at 634–36 (lamenting securities disclosure as a flawed
alternative to substantive regulatory reform and specifically citing DFA § 1502); see also Part I.B.2.
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ways in which communication influences how legal obligations are
interpreted, applied, and enforced.150
What distinguishes constructive discourse from traditional conceptions
of mandatory disclosure is that its value is not directly derived from
external responses to disclosed information.
Whereas predominant
rationales for mandatory disclosure focus on the use of information by
stakeholders, constructive discourse emphasizes how MNEs can benefit
from TST through firm-level, internally generated change. Constructive
discourse posits that mandatory disclosure works when it helps incentivize
MNEs to facilitate communication with each other and stakeholders.
Rather than constituting a legal doctrine or specific operational
practices, constructive discourse may be viewed as a set of principles to
show how firms can use social transparency for their own ends. Facilitating
firm level discourse augments the impact of stakeholder pressure on MNEs
by channeling the potentially transformative effects of norms and ideas,
which can lead to changes in the underlying interests of firms.151
Therefore, the effectiveness of a given TST regime can be gauged by its
ability to catalyze the corporate policymaking and self-regulation processes
through which MNEs identify information concerning their social impacts,
ascertain their significance and relevance, and reconcile them with other
corporate objectives. The insights of constructive discourse suggest that
TST regimes should focus on establishing procedures to guide the decision
making of MNEs and communication between them instead of crafting
disclosure requirements with the arguably false hope of achieving
predetermined policy outcomes.152
Constructive discourse consists of two nonsequential, overlapping, and
mutually reinforcing dimensions: an integrative dimension and an
expressive dimension.
The following figure summarizes the basic
characteristics of each dimension.

150
The author of this Article has previously explored applications of a related concept in other
international legal contexts. See Stephen Kim Park, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: Reviving
Global Trade and Development After Doha, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 397–413 (2013) (examining how
development-based human rights doctrine can serve as the basis for institutional communication in the
global trade regime).
151
See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on
International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 54–56 (2012) (identifying as a source
of power in international relations the ability to shape, through the spread of norms and ideas, what
societies see as legitimate and acceptable).
152
See Hess, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic
Models of Post-Regulatory Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299, 310–12 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1986)) (calling for a legal approach that enables a corporation and its stakeholders to more
effectively communicate and influence each other rather than seeking “utopian and unrealistic”
comprehensive social planning).
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Figure 3. Integrative and Expressive Dimensions of Constructive Discourse
Integrative

Expressive

How MNEs use disclosure
to learn about their activities

Purpose

How MNEs communicate
through disclosure

MNE internal actors (e.g.,
management, directors,
employees)

Targets

Other MNEs and
stakeholders

1. Integrative Dimension
The integrative dimension of constructive discourse focuses on what
corporate managers learn about the MNEs' social impacts through the
disclosure process. In order for MNEs to maximize the utility that they
derive from complying with TST disclosure requirements, they must be
able to recognize the extent to which the social values underlying the TST
regime bear on their own self-conceptions.153 Constructive discourse
facilitates the integration of the competing values underlying firm-level
profit maximization and society-level noneconomic objectives. These
distinct values are frequently difficult to reconcile thereby leading to a
cognitive-like dissonance among corporate managers.154 This dissonance
between MNEs dual institutional selves—as profit maximizers on the one
hand versus virtuous global citizens on the other—may lead to doubt and
conflict about how to fulfill their social obligations. A firm’s perception of
its social obligations is determined by prevailing social expectations among
stakeholders and other external parties of what constitutes appropriate
business behavior.155
153
For example, the human rights aspirations of MNEs may range from a fear of negative publicity
arising from gross violations of human rights to a deep-rooted normative commitment to human rights
principles. In any event, there are potential conflicts between any such social values and other corporate
objectives.
154
See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,
52 INT’L. ORG. 887, 904 (1998) (noting how self-awareness of discrepancies between words and actions
and a consequent desire to enhance self-esteem lead to changes to norm-violating behavior by state
leaders).
155
Jackson, supra note 77, at 120. The instrumental effect of social expectations is evident in the
concept of a “social license,” which consists of the demands on and expectations for a business
enterprise emerging from civil society. The demands of social licensors constrain corporate conduct
independent of compliance with law. See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton,
Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 307, 308 (2004); see also Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 124–25 (noting the importance of social
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For example, many corporate codes of conduct include express
commitments to social values such as human rights.156 Whether such codes
are developed ad hoc for a specific firm (internal codes) or for multiple
firms in a specific industry or generally (model or external codes), an MNE
is expected to pledge itself publicly to a code’s principles, standards, or
guidelines.157 Nonetheless, there are cognitive gaps between the MNEs’
legalistic commitment to social values set forth in codes of conduct and
their understanding of what is required to actually fulfill them.158 The
substance of disclosed information can help make tangible to MNEs the
disjuncture between their rhetoric and their actions with respect to social
values—i.e., when confronting themselves with information regarding their
conduct, MNEs may realize that they are not who they claim to be.159
Disclosed information regarding the adverse effects of MNEs on the
protection of human rights, for example, can add social meaning to abstract
legal mandates.160 In doing so, MNEs and their corporate managers
identify and define for themselves the prescriptive value of a given TST
regime.161 By linking specific situations to normatively meaningful social
values, the act of disclosing may reduce ambiguity regarding the purpose of
mandatory disclosure rules thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the TST
regime itself.162
Beyond recognizing the relevance of norms, MNEs can use disclosure
to facilitate creative and critical thinking about how to minimize the

license to MNEs that operate in host countries with weak governments).
156
See Murphy, supra note 101, at 400.
157
See id. at 400–01. Many corporate codes of conduct include provisions on information
disclosure by MNEs. Ratner, supra note 91, at 531.
158
See Murphy, supra note 101, at 421–22.
159
See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 154, at 903–04 (noting the role of conformity and selfesteem in shaping compliance with norms); Park, supra note 150, at 402 (noting the effects of rightsbased norms on self-conceptions of state behavior).
160
See Woods, supra note 76, at 65 (noting the impact of advertisements on triggering implicit
attitudes).
161
See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an
Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 72 (2000) (arguing that
law is persuasive when it calls upon legal reasoning to justify its processes and substantive goals);
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 154, at 891 (identifying the quality of “oughtness” in norms that
establish standards for socially appropriate or proper behavior).
162
See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 706
(1988) (defining legitimacy as the “quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of those
to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process”); Christiana
Ochoa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Compliance: Lessons from the International Law International Relations Discourse, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 169, 174 (2011) (applying Franck’s
legitimacy framework to CSR regimes); see also Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A
Corporate Executive's Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 592 (2004)
(observing that a businessperson must believe “that the purpose behind the law is sufficiently noble” in
order to be willing to forego pecuniary self-interest).
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adverse social impacts of their cross-border activities.163 The act of
disclosing requires that the various divisions within MNEs coordinate with
each other to create monitoring systems, implement industry best practices,
modernize data collection, and strengthen internal controls and risk
management functions. TST regimes are “reflexion” mechanisms, which
are defined as internal firm procedures that facilitate self-critical reflection
by MNEs about how to identify, substantiate, and fulfill normative
understandings.164 Disclosed information provides MNEs with strategically
valuable knowledge about how they operate and the perceptions of their
operations among stakeholders.165
2. Expressive Dimension
The expressive dimension of constructive discourse focuses on
disclosure as the basis for social, interactive communication by MNEs. It
focuses on processes through which MNEs use disclosure to communicate
with each other and stakeholders regarding the implications of adverse
social impacts. Political theorists and sociologists have analyzed the causal
significance of argumentation, persuasion, acculturation, and other forms of
socialization in influencing state compliance with international law.166
According to these approaches, states comply with international human
rights because they come to agree with their normative content through
moral discourse.167 Rhetorical commitments by states—initially driven by
instrumental calculations based on reputation, power, and legitimacy—may
eventually lead to the internalization of human rights norms.168 Likewise,
the ideas, values, and beliefs of MNEs are shaped through social processes
163
See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV.
239 (1983) (articulating the theory of reflexive law); see also Hess, supra note 18, at 66–72 (applying
reflexive law principles to CSR reporting); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1231–32 (1995) (identifying the application of reflexive law theory to environmental
management).
164
See Hess, supra note 18, at 51; Orts, supra note 163, at 1253.
165
See Hess, supra note 18, at 81–82.
166
See Hafner-Burton, Victor & Lupu, supra note 151, at 57 (identifying persuasion and
communication as a source of power in international relations).
167
See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms
Into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 8–13 (Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink & Stephen C. Ropp eds., 1999); Joel P.
Trachtman, Who Cares About International Human Rights?: The Supply and Demand of International
Human Rights Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 851, 876 (2012).
168
See Suzanne Katzenstein, Reverse-Rhetorical Entrapment: Naming and Shaming as a Two-Way
Street, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1079, 1084–85 (2013) (describing the “rhetorical entrapment” of
governments through naming and shaming by human rights groups). But see Oona A. Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2006–07 (2002) (noting that, in
absence of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, a country may express its commitment to
a human rights treaty while failing to meet its substantive requirements).
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that generate shared understandings and mutual expectations.169
While theories of state-centric behavior should not be carelessly
applied to MNEs, both share certain important characteristics.170 Like
states, processes of socialization between MNEs and other stakeholders
influence how they act and on what grounds they justify their actions.171 As
with states and political leaders, the salience of social values to MNEs is
premised on the ability of corporate managers to persuade others and a
willingness on the part of corporate managers to be persuaded.172
The expressive dimension of constructive discourse reframes
disclosure as an inherently social process both within and between
MNEs.173 Through the information gathering and due diligence activities
that they require firms to conduct, TST regimes help shape what kinds of
corporate conduct are seen as valid by defining the scope of socially
legitimate behavior. Through its compliance with disclosure rules, an MNE
makes a public commitment to the broader social values on which the TST
regime is based.174 By this measure, the more robust the disclosure
requirement, the stronger the MNE’s commitment to fulfill its goals.175
Further, references to social values, such as international human rights,
in TST-mandated disclosure documents may influence the language used in
169
See Ochoa, supra note 162, at 171–75 (applying state-based international relations theory to the
problem of MNE compliance with global CSR norms).
170
See id. at 176 (cautioning that processes of socialization among MNEs require more formality
and institutionalization in comparison to states); Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorothée
Baumann, Global Rules and Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in
Global Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 505, 522 (2006) (noting the “striking parallel” between
corporate and governmental reactions to accusations of human rights violations).
171
Just as individuals are neither pure manifestations of self-interested homo economicus or
cooperative homo reciprocans, both states and MNEs must also grapple with competing allegiances.
Although governments and corporate management should not be casually attributed with human
characteristics, their respective decision-making processes are driven by individuals and groups of
individuals.
172
See Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1,
14–16 (2000) (describing the conditions in which argumentative persuasion in international negotiations
is feasible); see also Steven R. Ratner, Persuading to Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of
Legal Argumentation, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 572 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds.,
2012).
173
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 51, at 632 (stating that “disclosure is importantly social”); see
also Gerald F. Davis, New Directions in Corporate Governance, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 143, 158 (2005)
(observing that a firm’s credibility concerning its accountability and transparency “is a matter of
rhetoric”).
174
See Hathaway, supra note 168, at 2005 (noting the expressive function of treaties arising from
what a country’s membership in a treaty regime signals to other domestic or international actors);
Woods, supra note 76, at 82–83 (suggesting that state compliance with a human rights norm is enhanced
by the act of publicly declaring its commitment to the norm).
175
See Woods, supra note 76, at 83–84 (arguing that human rights action plans can serve as
commitment devices).
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discourse among MNEs and between MNEs and their respective
stakeholders.176 This may be viewed positively or negatively. Spurred by
external public pressure from NGOs, SRIs, and similar stakeholder groups
that have access to disclosed information, the processes of socialization
may lead to more frequent references to noneconomic values by corporate
managers.177 However, while the adaption of social rights language in
securities disclosure may elevate the agendas of NGOs and other
stakeholders, it also runs the risk of compromising future action to address
adverse social impacts.178 These language compromises may diminish the
rhetorical power of disclosure by cloaking adverse social impacts in legal
and technical jargon.179 The potentially negative effects of assimilation
suggest that regulatory oversight and bright-line rules limiting the
autonomy of MNEs to determine how to comply with disclosure
requirements are warranted.180 Arguably, the transplantation of TST
regimes into the relatively robust, far reaching enforcement mechanisms of
U.S. federal securities law helps serve this purpose.181
In addition, disclosure is useful as a means to enable institutional
learning by MNEs. MNEs can use the substance of disclosed information
to generate a shared vocabulary with other MNEs and stakeholders on how
social objectives should be balanced with other corporate objectives.
Further, by facilitating the internalization of social norms within MNEs, the
very act of using disclosed information to communicate externally
facilitates evolutionary, iterative standard setting by MNEs.182
176
See Jena Martin, Business and Human Rights: What's the Board Got to Do With It?, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 959, 992 (2013) (stating that articulating human rights as business risk may make it easier for
firms to understand); Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a Global
Economic Order: An Analysis of a Discourse, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 57, 106 (2003) (identifying
the evolution of a shared “pidgin” language between international human rights and economic actors).
177
See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 167, at 25; Thomas Risse, Governance under Limited
Sovereignty, in BACK TO BASICS: STATE POWER IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD 93 (Martha Finnemore
& Judith Goldstein eds., 2013). The special role of in-house counsel as corporate managers with unique
fiduciary duties and disclosure responsibilities is described later in this Article. See infra Part IV.B.2.
178
See Ochoa, supra note 176, at 110–12; see also Katzenstein, supra note 168, at 1081–82 (arguing
that governments are capable of shifting human rights discourse with NGOs in a manner to justify and
reaffirm their own consequentialist justifications).
179
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 51, at 633 (arguing that lawyers have a “community of interest”
in using disclosure “language that is technically accurate but manages to sound remote”); Ochoa, supra
note 176, at 112 (arguing that language compromises between the human rights and international
economic communities may preclude future action by formulating rights as economically based).
180
See Ford, supra note 97, at 48 (proposing that deliberation and argumentation regarding
regulatory compliance be subject to certain non-negotiable rules); Jackson, supra note 77, at 148
(advocating external verification of MNEs’ human rights reporting).
181
See Hess, supra note 18, at 72 (proposing regulatory oversight coupled with private enforcement
of mandatory social reporting standards); see also Hathaway, supra note 168, at 2014 (suggesting that
compliance with human rights treaties—and hence the substantive value of their expressive function—is
bolstered by monitoring and enforcement mechanisms).
182
See Ford, supra note 97, at 36 (describing one of the advantages of principles-based regulation).
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Communication between MNEs and regulators, as well as information
sharing among MNEs, facilitates the use of best practices and other forms
of self-learning by firms.183 By drawing from an array of particularized
examples of ways in which they address the social impacts of their conduct,
MNEs can use TST disclosed information to more effectively engage in
dialogue with civil society, regulators, shareholders, and other MNEs about
what is socially appropriate and necessary.184
While these actions are a potential source of value to MNEs on their
own terms, they also serve the purpose of signaling to other MNEs their
willingness to reconcile business and social values by following certain
standardized, socially legitimated models of corporate behavior.185
Acculturation shapes behavior by generating social pressure to conform
with the expectations of a self-identified reference group.186 In this vein,
the proliferation of voluntary CSR certification schemes suggests that
MNEs may seek to expressly acknowledge their conformity to global social
values by “joining the club.”187
B. Constructive Discourse and Corporate Strategy
One of the overarching purposes of constructive discourse is to
harmonize the traditional regulatory foundations of TST and its New
Governance aspects. The efficacy of TST depends, at least in part, on the
MNEs’ perception that they stand to individually gain from the visibility of
their efforts to properly and thoroughly disclose information regarding their
adverse social impacts.188 Identifying positive synergies between disclosure
requirements and firm-level utility will increase the likelihood that firms
will improve the process, which will enhance both the sustainability and

In this respect, the rules-based orientation of U.S. federal securities law arguably hinders the dynamic
and insightful lawmaking carried out by firms in principles-based securities regulation regimes, such as
the United Kingdom.
183
Best practices involve regulated entities “devis[ing] practices to comply with relatively
unspecific regulatory requirements,” which are then selected and publicized as “best” by public
regulators with the idea that these best practices will “be subsequently adopted by other regulated
entities.” See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 308 (2006).
184
See Hess, supra note 18, at 82–83.
185
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 667–68 (2004).
186
See id. at 638; see also Trachtman, supra note 167, at 876–77; Woods, supra note 76, at 72.
187
See Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001
and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (2005) (describing how corporate
adherence to ISO 14001 environmental standards is driven by the appeal of the club's positive brand
reputation).
188
See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 112 (observing that changing disclosers’
perceptions of self-interest helps improve transparency systems and ensure their survival).
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effectiveness of TST regimes.189 The following discussion explores several
ways that MNEs can strategically use constructive discourse. These
strategic considerations fall into two broad categories: managing risk and
enhancing competitive advantage.
Both considerations rest on the
instrumental value of social transparency—that is, as a means of increasing
profits, enhancing shareholder value, and improving the financial interests
of the firm.190
1. As Risk Management
Constructive discourse as risk management is based on the use of TST
disclosure to prevent, identify, monitor, and mitigate adverse business
outcomes.191 These potential outcomes may be characterized as “risk”—
contingent events that may potentially lead to future harm to the firm.192
Risk management involves organizational processes through which a firm
seeks to optimize the types and levels of risk with its strategic goals.193
The relationship between TST and risk management is manifested in
two ways. First, MNEs must be cognizant of operational risk, which is
defined as the “risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal
processes, people and systems or from external events.”194 Among the
components of operational risk is compliance risk—i.e., risk of legal or
regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation as a result
of a failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory
organization standards, and codes of conduct.195 MNEs may face several
different forms of operational risk arising from their cross-border activities.
First and foremost, MNEs must ensure their compliance with TST
mandatory disclosure rules. Further, adverse social impacts, such as
corporate complicity with international human rights, often present legal
189
Hess, supra note 49, at 468; see also Ford, supra note 97, at 49 (asserting that a firm is more
likely to comply when it is able to identify a link between its long-term business success and strong
internal compliance processes).
190
See Jackson, supra note 77, at 121.
191
See Carroll & Shabana, supra note 13, at 97 (summarizing justifications for CSR practices based
on reducing costs and risks to the firm).
192
See Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323,
1328–29 (2010); Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management,
15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1010 (2013).
193
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 969
(2009).
194
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE
SOUND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL RISK 3 n.5 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs195.pdf.
195
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMPLIANCE
AND THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS 7 (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf
(defining compliance risk).
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risks.196 MNEs can address these risks by conducting ongoing due
diligence of their activities, operations, and relationships. A prominent
application is human rights due diligence, which involves the identification
and investigation of relevant facts and then evaluation of those facts in light
of a prevailing standard of care.197 As an integral component of a
corporation’s enterprise risk management program, human rights due
diligence overlaps with the common law duty of oversight, which requires
that corporate boards attempt to ensure that an adequate internal
information and reporting system is in place.198
Second, in the context of their adverse social impacts, MNEs must be
concerned with risks to their reputation arising from negative publicity for
failure to comply with social norms.199 Reputation risks can be extremely
costly albeit difficult to calculate as intangible assets.200 MNEs are
increasingly aware of risks to their global brands due to adverse human
rights, environmental, and labor impacts in their global supply chains.201
By formalizing social norms in the language of law, TST may augment
reputational sanctions by making violation of norms more unambiguous.202
From a social welfare perspective, however, one objection to the use
of TST as a risk management tool is that it suggests that adverse social
impacts can be rationalized and contextualized.203 According to these
observers, risk management cannot be solely justified on instrumental

196
See Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law
Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 160 (2013) (referring to violations of local
civil and criminal laws and domestic regulations in host country stemming from human rights abuses).
197
Mark B. Taylor, Luc Zandvliet & Mitra Forouhar, Due Diligence for Human Rights: A RiskBased Approach 3–4 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harv. Univ., Corporate Social Responsibility
Initiative, Working Paper No. 53, Oct. 2009); see also Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for
Funding Gross Human Rights Violations?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 451, 519 (2012) (describing the
implementation of human rights risk management in accordance with the Guiding Principles).
198
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (establishing the
standard of conduct for director oversight); see Ho, supra note 196, at 157–58 (describing the Caremark
duty in the context of human rights due diligence); see also Harner, supra note 192, at 1332 (describing
enterprise risk management (or ERM) as a “holistic approach to risk management that considers
strategic and operational risks in addition to financial risks”).
199
See O’Callaghan, supra note 12, at 109 (identifying the environment, labor exploitation,
indifference to the health and safety of workers, complicity in human rights abuses, and corruption and
bribery as elements of reputation risk).
200
See id. at 108–09.
201
See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance
Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L.325, 338–42 (2008) (describing the development of
assurance services to certify that suppliers meet social standards in order to protect MNEs’ “brand
value”).
202
See Park, supra note 150, at 404, 406 (noting how rights-based discourse can enhance
reputational sanctions).
203
See Jackson, supra note 77, at 130–31 (arguing against the idea that the human rights
responsibilities of business are defined by and justified with reference to social expectations).
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grounds.204 The convergence of “human rights” and “risk management”
reflects the fact that the concept of risk management itself is defined by
rhetorical and political practices that define what sorts of contingent events
constitute a “risk” in the first place.205 For example, the concept of human
rights due diligence requires that firms evaluate risk from the perspective of
potential victims not just risks faced by firms.206
TST regimes further reflect, highlight, and shape prevailing standards
of corporate behavior.207 The due diligence, monitoring, auditing, and
supply chain management requirements in DFA § 1502 codify and
incorporate principles of human rights due diligence.208 By requiring firms
to conduct due diligence, DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 force firms to
integrate human rights impact assessments into their existing risk
management systems.209
2. For Competitive Advantage
The use of TST for competitive advantage rests on the ability of MNEs
to use social transparency to differentiate themselves from their
competitors.210 The social complexity of an MNE’s relationships with its
various stakeholders—defined by a web of overlapping, confusing, and
sometimes conflicting legal obligations and social phenomena—can
provide various opportunities for social transparency to be a source of
sustainable competitive advantage.211 TST enables firms to maximize and
preserve their “reputation capital,” which provides them with the credibility
to profitably engage with regulators, NGOs, communities, and other

204
See Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great
Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739, 759 (2012) (arguing that corporations should have an affirmative
obligation to help realize human rights, not merely respect them).
205
See Weber, supra note 192, at 1063.
206
See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, ¶ 17 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples
BusinessHR_EN.pdf (providing that ERM must include risks to rights holders).
207
See Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 330 (noting how NGOs and other
external stakeholders use compliance with regulation to judge compliance with social obligations).
208
See Narine, supra note 145, at 371; Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 106 (referring to DFA § 1502).
209
See Richardson, supra note 61, at 257 (arguing that translating environmental and ethical
concerns as business risk through mandatory disclosure requirements helps facilitate corporate
awareness of adverse social impacts).
210
See Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 72 (2011)
(identifying value, rareness, imperfect imitability, and the lack of an equal substitute as components of
competitive advantage); Carroll & Shabana, supra note 13, at 97–99 (summarizing justifications for
CSR practices based on gaining competitive advantage).
211
See Bird, supra note 210, at 76 (defining social complexity as situations “when the source of a
competitive advantage is known, but the method of replicating the advantage is difficult to identify due
to social phenomena”).
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stakeholders.212 While corporate efforts to strategically conform with social
norms may lead to broader social benefits, that is not a precondition to its
use by MNEs.213
For MNEs in industries where adverse social impacts are relatively
common, the very act of complying with TST regimes may serve as an
advantageous market signal.214 While the “first mover” advantage accorded
to firms may be diminished when disclosure is mandatory rather than
voluntary, firms can augment the benefits of signaling by finding new
means to communicate their culture of compliance to customers, investors,
regulators, and other external parties.215 An MNE can use disclosure to
inform its stakeholders of its efforts to achieve the TST regime’s policy
goals by highlighting how it identifies, justifies, mitigates, and ultimately
seeks to avoid adverse social impacts. A record of socially responsible
disclosure practices may build trust with various stakeholders, thereby
leading to potentially favorable legal treatment for MNEs.216 Investors may
value a corporation’s willingness to disclose information regarding its
social impacts resulting in shareholder support of management and
increased interest from prospective investors.217 Socially conscientious
employees may value both the principle of transparency and greater
knowledge about where they work.218 Regulators may grant greater
autonomy to socially transparent MNEs in implementing internal reporting
and due diligence regimes.219 SRIs may be more willing to add socially
transparent MNEs to their selective lists of permitted investments or give
such MNEs higher ratings.220 NGOs may choose to cooperate with MNEs
212
See Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 319, 320 (listing the use of reputation
capital to obtain access to lawmakers, the trust of regulators, the tolerance of local communities, and the
least risk of being targeted by NGOs).
213
See Davis, supra note 173, at 153 (describing studies on strategic conformity by companies that
do not lead to changes in the company’s behavior).
214
See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 119–20 (noting that firms may gain “first mover”
advantages from providing more information than competitors and then raising the bar of mandated
disclosure); Babcock, supra note 77, at 36 (noting how companies that engage in voluntary
environmental disclosure can curry favor from investors as early adopters).
215
See James Rathz, Compliance as the Competitive Differentiator, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 13, 23–24
(2009) (describing how financial professionals can use communication channels such as RFP responses,
pitch books or prospect presentations, website profiles, newsletters, brochures, client reports, customerservice oriented communications, and proposed narrative-based SEC disclosure).
216
See Carroll & Shabana, supra note 13, at 99 (noting that corporations can enhance their
legitimacy and reputation though social and environmental disclosure).
217
See Williams, supra note 2, at 1284–87 (describing the benefits of disclosure beyond compliance
with existing legal requirements to corporations).
218
See Babcock, supra note 77, at 37; Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1451–52; Faith Stevelman, Global
Finance, Multinationals and Human Rights: With Commentary on Backer’s Critique of the 2008 Report
by John Ruggie, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 101, 139 (2011).
219
See Bird, supra note 210, at 76; Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 331.
220
Babcock, supra note 77, at 36.
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instead of opposing them.221
The impact of reputation may be diminished by stakeholders’ inability
to compare MNEs across different industries, jurisdictions, organizational
forms, and business cultures.222 Arguably, the more detailed, vivid, and
focused the disclosed information is, the more effective it will be in
persuading investors and other stakeholders to respond to it.223 Due to its
specific focus and detailed procedural requirements, TST may help harness
the power of reputation.224 On a related note, legal scholars define
relational contracts as the penumbra of planning, trust, and solidarity norms
that exceed the terms of the legal agreement between parties.225 TST
regimes may be viewed as a means to nurture relational contracts among
MNEs in the same industry or between MNEs and their institutional
investors. The sharing of information—along with the attendant practices
and rituals associated with such information sharing—constitute the basis
for a particular kind of relationally based legal arrangement made possible
by the act of disclosure.226
V. APPLYING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE TO TARGETED
SOCIAL TRANSPARENCY
A. Analyzing the Current State of TST
TST regimes under U.S. federal securities law are an evolutionary step
in social transparency. By implementing narrowly focused disclosure
requirements for specific policy objectives, TST uses traditional regulatory
techniques to address social objectives in a new way.227 In comparison to
voluntary CSR reporting schemes (such as the GRI) and other forms of
social transparency (such as Regulation S-K), TST strips from firms a
substantial amount of discretionary authority to decide what, when, and
221
Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 326–27 (describing companies that engage
with environmental NGOs and community groups).
222
See Williams, supra note 2, at 1292–93 (noting how the relative lack of consistent, standardized
social performance data reporting hinders meaningful intercompany comparisons and analyses).
223
See Woods, supra note 76, at 77 (noting that reputational sanctions, such as shaming, works best
where there is clear rights violation, a clear violator, and a clear remedy).
224
See Patrick J. Keenan, Financial Globalization and Human Rights, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
509, 557–60 (2008) (arguing that formal, specific ratings linked to regulations can shape firm behavior
by assigning a value to reputation).
225
Bird, supra note 210, at 77.
226
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 760 (noting that increased disclosure bolsters
relational investing—i.e., increased holdings for longer durations by large investors).
227
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 405–06 tbl. 2 (2004) (comparing traditional
regulatory approaches to “New Governance” models based on reflexive law, soft law, democratic
experimentalism, and similar principles).
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how to disclose information. Current TST regimes under U.S. federal
securities law both facilitate and hinder corporate strategic action in
different ways.
The procedural components of DFA § 1502 have the potential to
facilitate the integrative function of constructive discourse. If firms are able
to use information collected through country of origin inquiries, internal
due diligence, and external audits to understand their impact in the Congo,
they will be able to more effectively manage commercial relationships with
supply chain intermediaries and third-party contract manufacturers in a way
that curbs the illicit trade of conflict minerals. Similarly, the various
reporting requirements of ITRA § 219 may facilitate corporate awareness of
the ways in which their responsibility to respect human rights in Iran relates
to the other nonhuman rights objectives of the U.S. sanctions program.
The expressive function of constructive discourse, however, is
hampered by current TST regimes. Based on a hierarchical, rules-based
approach to disclosure, both DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 may stifle
meaningful dialogue between MNEs and stakeholders. Both impose the
obligation to disclose on Exchange Act reporting companies that are
frequently not best situated to obtain the information.228 MNEs are often
required to extract information from persons and entities with which they
have extremely attenuated operational and legal relationships. In the case
of DFA § 1502, these entities are suppliers along their conflict minerals
supply chains, while for ITRA § 219, the entities may be foreign-domiciled
and non-U.S. law governed affiliates with which they transact. The use of
penalties for noncompliance with Exchange Act disclosure requirements
may inhibit the ultimate objectives of TST by jeopardizing industrygenerated, collaborative initiatives between MNEs, local companies, supply
chain intermediaries, governments, civil society, and multilateral
institutions.229
How might TST regimes be modified to enhance constructive
discourse? A constructive discourse approach to social transparency seeks
to reorient TST in the following ways: First, from external pressure to
internal assessment based on enlightened self-interest. Instead of acting
only in response to external pressure, such as the threat of civil liability,
MNEs should be able to use information from disclosure to engage in a
continual process of self-assessment that takes into account the range of
risks and strategic opportunities that they face in their commercial
relationships.
Second, from retrospective to prospective. Instead of merely telling
what happened through discrete acts of disclosure, MNEs should seek to
228

See Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 43, at 140.
See Seay, supra note 110 (arguing that DFA § 1502 has stifled multistakeholder dialogue and
initiatives in the Congo).
229
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draw from prior experiences to improve internal controls and contractual
relationships.
Third, from static to social. Instead of viewing disclosure as a series
of discrete, onetime events, MNEs should engage in a broad array of
interactions with each other and their respective stakeholders in the context
of their social impacts.
Fourth, from a bright-line distinction between disclosure and
regulation to a nuanced, case-by-case determination of the social utility of
disclosure.
Instead of viewing mandatory disclosure as a blanket
alternative to direct government regulation, regulators should have the
discretion to permit the alternate use of voluntary reporting mechanisms
created by MNEs on a case-by-case basis.
B. Proposals for Improving TST
The concept of constructive discourse provides a template for
improving current approaches to TST. TST can be modified in various
ways to facilitate its use by MNEs for their strategic benefit while
concurrently furthering the social objectives of TST. The following
discussion proposes several different kinds of reforms and explores their
potential implications.
1. Leveraging Voluntary CSR Reporting
A key challenge for regulators, stakeholders, and other interested
external parties is to inform and convince MNEs of the potential gains from
TST compliance. Voluntary CSR associations, established by MNEs in
conjunction with NGOs, may play an important role in this learning process
through the creation of targeted reporting and complaint mechanisms.230
Alternatively, MNEs can take a positively reinforcing, proactive role
through the use of privately trained and authorized audit and certification
services that ensure compliance with social responsibility standards.231
Third party assurance services help MNEs signal their commitment to
social concerns to NGOs and SRIs.232 Notwithstanding the fact that third230
See Park, supra note 150, at 412; see also Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1458–59 (identifying NGOs
as partners in gathering and disclosing information about social harms, developing standards for socially
responsible conduct, organizing boycotts, and lobbying for political action).
231
See Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 201, at 333–34. For example, MNEs have established
conflict minerals disclosure programs in anticipation of the implementation of DFA § 1502. See
Quentin Hardy, Combating Tech’s Conflict Minerals With Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Apr. 15,
2013),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/combating-techs-conflict-minerals-with-disclosure
(describing Hewlett-Packard’s smelter documentation initiative, which requires that HP’s supply chain
suppliers abstain from purchasing conflict minerals from a list of 195 ore smelters).
232
See Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 201, at 342–46. Specifically in the area of business and
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party assurance services were initially developed in the context of voluntary
CSR reporting, MNEs can benefit from multistakeholder oversight in
respect of the same objectives addressed through a specific TST regime.
Public–private governance schemes based on multistakeholder
dialogue between governments, firms and industry associations, and NGOs
seek to bridge the gap between traditional governmental regulation and
New Governance.233 Perhaps most notably, the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme addresses the link between the diamond trade, child
labor, and civil conflict in Africa.234 Established in accordance with the
mandate of the United Nations, the Kimberley Process is a nonbinding
governance regime that restricts the trade of conflict diamonds through a
government-run certification scheme.235 Although the certification scheme
is solely managed by its forty-nine member states, the Kimberley Process
also includes NGOs and industry groups as observers, and collaborates with
other multistakeholder initiatives such as the EITI.236 The Clean Diamond
Trade Act implements the Kimberley Process under U.S. law by banning
the importation of non-Kimberley Process certified diamonds and
establishing domestic certification and enforcement processes.237
The parallels between DFA § 1502 and the Kimberley Process have
been addressed by numerous commentators.238 Notwithstanding the
success of the Kimberley Process, the viability of multistakeholder
approaches as a universal means to address the shortcomings of TST is
human rights, the Mazars & Shift Project establishes a twin set of standards for human rights reporting
and assurance based on the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (the Guiding Principles), a voluntary,
multistakeholder framework spearheaded by the Special Representative of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral John Ruggie. The reporting standard requires a participating company to articulate and make
public its fidelity with the Guiding Principles while developing internal metrics to track its progress
toward full alignment. The assurance standard provides an external, third-party audit of the company’s
implementation of the Guiding Principles based on methodology developed by individual human rights
assurance providers. See MAZARS & SHIFT, THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING AND
ASSURANCE FRAMEWORKS INITIATIVE (“RAFI”) (Nov. 2013), available at http://businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/rafi-framing-document-2013.pdf.
233
See Stevelman, supra note 218, at 111 (noting the emergence of a multitude of multistakeholder
initiatives in the area of business and human rights).
234
Conflict diamonds (also commonly referred to as blood diamonds) are defined as “rough
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate
governments.” KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME CORE DOCUMENT 3, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document.
235
See Diane A. Desierto, Leveraging International Economic Tools To Confront Child Soldiering,
43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 337, 365–66 (2011).
236
See Julie Elizabeth Nichols, A Conflict of Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe’s
Marange Diamond Fields, 40 DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 648, 661–63 (2012).
237
19 U.S.C. § 3903(a) (2006).
238
See Narine, supra note 145, at 395–96; Taylor, supra note 115, at 115–16; Woody, supra note
71, at 1347–51; Shannon Raj, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation That
Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 994–1000 (2011).
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uncertain. The express foreign policy objectives underlying TST regimes
render global regulatory uniformity unlikely thereby hindering the informal
governmental coordination that characterizes the Kimberley Process.239
This is particularly evident with respect to ITRA § 219. Its disclosure
requirements concern the activities of a broad array of business actors that
do business in Iran across a range of economic sectors.240 Further, it is
arguably unclear how MNEs view the urgency of human rights abuses in
Iran compared to the conflict minerals trade in the Congo.241 These factors
render it unlikely that organic multistakeholder initiatives involving MNEs,
local and regional companies, civil society groups, governments, and
multilateral institutions will develop absent regulatory incentives.
To overcome these complicating factors, regulatory reforms should
focus on leveraging existing voluntary CSR reporting in ways that enhance
constructive discourse. MNEs can benefit from intersectoral collection and
sharing of information between MNEs regarding their respective supply
chains and affiliate relationships. To facilitate the use of best practices,
centralized data repositories would help Exchange Act reporting companies
share information regarding their respective due diligence and certification
processes. These repositories could be comanaged by the SEC and private
entities, provide information across multiple TST regimes, and be publicly
accessible to stakeholders.242 By integrating these information-sharing
239
The OECD has established a voluntary framework to guide firms in conducting due diligence in
connection with supply chain management of conflict minerals. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM
CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS 3 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf. DFA § 1502 requires that Exchange Act reporting companies use a
nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework to conduct their conflict mineral due
diligence. See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56,282 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249b (2012)). One pair of commentators has suggested that the adoption of the OECD guidelines as the
only DFA §1502-compliant due diligence framework may effectively crowd out smaller-scale local,
regional, or national due diligence systems, including industry-based initiatives. See Jamie Darin
Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity, 47 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 487, 499–500 (2014).
240
See Desierto, supra note 235, at 365–66 (contrasting the Kimberley Process’s sole focus on the
diamond trade to the various goods produced by child soldiers).
241
See id. at 366–67 (noting the unique political circumstances precipitating the Kimberley
Process).
242
In the context of business and human rights, several private sector initiatives have emerged with
the goal of disseminating best practices. The Human Rights and Business Dilemmas Forum, a project
implemented in partnership with the UN Global Compact, seeks to facilitate intersectoral discussion of
human rights dilemmas through case studies. See UN Global Compact, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS
DILEMMAS FORUM, http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). A private
sector initiative, the Global Corporate Community of Practice (GCCP), seeks to help companies collect,
develop, and share experiences of human rights due diligence and risk management. Launched by the
UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the GCCP is aimed at assisting firms implementing
the mandate of the Guiding Principles. See INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, GLOBAL CORPORATE COMMUNITY
OF PRACTICE FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, NEW INITIATIVE OF THE UN WORKING GROUP ON
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practices into mandatory disclosure requirements, TST regimes would help
MNEs mitigate the operational risks they face worldwide while also
deepening MNEs’ commitment to the social values associated with specific
TST regimes.
Further, to reduce firm-level compliance costs and facilitate industrylevel best practices and regulatory experimentation, TST regimes should
grant mutual recognition to alternate voluntary schemes that fulfill similar
substantive purposes.243 Several European countries have either permitted
or encouraged the use of GRI guidelines to fulfill social and environmental
reporting requirements.244
The European Commission is currently
considering measures that would require substantially enhanced mandatory
disclosure by large European companies on various social matters,
including environmental sustainability and human rights.245 This proposal
would permit EU reporting companies to use internationally recognized
multistakeholder frameworks in lieu of EU-based or governmentpromulgated guidelines.246 Most notably, if the EU conflict minerals
regulations proposed by the European Commission in March 2014 are
implemented, discussions regarding potential means to grant mutual
recognition under DFA § 1502 should be explored.
2. Empowering In-House Corporate Lawyers
The effectiveness of TST depends on the usefulness of the disclosed
information that it mandates. Within a corporation, this responsibility
largely lies with management in charge of day-to-day operations. Not only
must corporate managers ensure that the firm complies with mandatory
disclosure requirements, they are also entrusted with exercising judgment
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR A GLOBAL CORPORATE COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE (2012),
available at http://www.ioe-emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/ business_
and_human_rights/EN/_2012-10-15__G119_UNWG_BHR_Global_Corporate_Community_of_
Practice_ with_annex__website_.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
243
See Hess, supra note 21, at 472 (proposing that mandatory social reporting should be consistent
with voluntary CSR reporting schemes such as the GRI). Mutual recognition could be also applied to
TST regimes established by foreign regulators. See Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 125 (proposing
international regulatory convergence around social transparency).
244
See Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 599.
245
See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC As Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial
and Diversity Information by Certain Large Companies and Groups, COM (2013) 207 (Apr. 16, 2013).
246
Among the guidelines expressly granted mutual recognition are national frameworks, EU-based
frameworks such as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), and international frameworks
such as the GRI, the Guiding Principles, the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 26000, and the
International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy. See id. at 9–10, 12.
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about whether to disclose, what to disclose, and how to use disclosed
information for the corporation’s benefit.247 In comparison to voluntary
CSR reporting, the mandatory nature of TST regimes reduces managerial
discretion.248 Nonetheless, managers have significant control thereby
reinforcing concerns about their lack of accountability to shareholders and
other stakeholders.249 For example, corporate management may decide to
disclose more than the bare minimum required by TST rules or to use TSTmandated disclosure to change its practices to further social goals, even if
doing so means sacrificing short-term shareholder interests.250
Alternatively, while there are situations in which benefits to stakeholders
also enhance corporate profits and shareholder wealth, corporate
management could alternatively disregard any social value for their own
selfish ends.251 On the other hand, greater managerial discretion may free
managers to make case-by-case determinations for the benefit of society.252
In this context, lawyers⎯along with accountants, auditors and
securities analysts⎯are entrusted with a core function of corporate
governance: maximizing the effectiveness of regulatory compliance by
reducing information asymmetries between corporations and outside
parties.253 As informational intermediaries, they are entrusted with ensuring
the completeness, timeliness, and readability of mandatory disclosures.254
To carry out these duties, they collect, organize, process, and disseminate
relevant information disclosed by firms for the benefit of investors and
247
See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1628–31 (2005) (describing, inter alia, the duty of loyalty, duty of
ordinary care, and the duty to provide information and assist directors in understanding the significance
of reported information).
248
See H. Rodgin Cohen & Glen T. Schleyer, Shareholder vs. Director Control Over Social Policy
Matters: Conflicting Trends in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81,
107 (2012) (identifying DFA § 1502 as a prominent example of the use of mandatory disclosure to
protect shareholder interests); see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 760 (noting the
effects of disclosure on inefficient management).
249
See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1465; Shelley, supra note 102, at 116–18.
250
See Ostas, supra note 162, at 590.
251
See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1460–61.
252
See David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy,
10 M.I.T. J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 15 (2001) (noting the ability of altruistic managers to
redistribute shareholders’ wealth through policies and operating practices); Shelley, supra note 102, at
135 (acknowledging that certain kinds of managerial entrenchment may facilitate socially-beneficial
corporate innovation). But see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (famously arguing that corporate executives that seek to
address social goals at the expense of shareholder interests are abrogating their social responsibilities).
253
See Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1089,
1089, 1091 (2008) (referencing John Coffee’s thesis on the core contribution of gatekeepers).
254
See Preeti Choudhary, Jason D. Schloetzer & Jason D. Sturgess, Boards, Auditors, Attorneys and
Compliance with Mandatory SEC Disclosure Rules, 34 MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 471, 472 (2013)
(defining mandatory disclosure compliance as the extent to which mandatory SEC disclosures are
complete, timely, and readable).
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other stakeholders.255 These gatekeepers verify the quality of securities
disclosure on the basis of their ability to acquire more information about a
firm than outside parties and their reputation for integrity, thoroughness,
and accuracy.256
Lawyers, in particular, are uniquely equipped to facilitate constructive
discourse in TST regimes through their profession-specific skills and
values.
Both outside counsel and in-house corporate counsel are
responsible for preparing and reviewing the narrative and other textual parts
of disclosure documents.257 Above all other kinds of gatekeepers, lawyers
play an indispensable role in condensing, conceptualizing, and organizing
information regarding an MNE’s operations.258
In addition to their technical skills, lawyers must also exercise
independent judgment and ethical sensibility in determining how to balance
private corporate interests with the public interest.259
For these
nontechnical tasks, in-house corporate lawyers are capable of helping
embed compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements into corporate
decision making processes, thereby consolidating their effectiveness in
shaping corporate conduct.260 Due to their knowledge of their clients’
unique risk appetites, strategic priorities, and organizational cultures, inhouse counsel can communicate in the firm-specific and industry-specific
language necessary to influence corporate management to comply with
mandatory disclosure obligations.261
The value of in-house counsel is particularly high with respect to TST
regimes. For MNEs subject to heightened scrutiny from regulators,
shareholders, and the public, inadequate internal communication and
coordination channels can materially impact their ability to comply with
TST regimes that require substantial information gathering, internal
controls, and due diligence processes.262 In-house lawyers directly
255
See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 122–25; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 46, at
687–89; Hess, supra note 49, at 466–67.
256
See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2
(2006) (defining gatekeepers); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 8
U.C.L.A. SCHOLARLY PERSP. 1, 5 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1980975 (comparing the gatekeeping role of lawyers to auditors).
257
Choudhary, Schloetzer & Sturgess, supra note 254, at 472, 477.
258
See Choudhary, Schloetzer & Sturgess, supra note 254, at 482–83 (finding empirical evidence
that corporate attorneys are predominantly responsible for the readability of mandatory disclosure
documents).
259
See Manne, supra note 27, at 482–83.
260
The concept of embeddedness measures the degree to which information produced by mandatory
disclosure causes new responses by its users and then changes in the decision-making processes of
disclosers. See Fung, Weil, Graham & Fagotto, supra note 27, at 15.
261
See Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 117–18 (2011).
262
See Martin, supra note 176, at 988–90 (identifying the importance of board-level information
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participate in the management and improvement of compliance systems.263
In this capacity, in-house counsel can help change perceptions of the
perceived value of TST-mandated disclosure to other corporate goals.
Buttressed by the risk of civil and criminal enforcement for noncompliance
with U.S. federal securities law, TST may help in-house counsel convince
otherwise skeptical or uncertain internal clients of the importance of social
transparency to the firm.264
On top of ensuring a firm’s compliance with TST requirements, inhouse lawyers are well suited to contribute to internal deliberations about
how social responsibility should be incorporated into broader business
strategies.265 Due to their knowledge of legal lexicon, argumentation, and
procedures, in-house lawyers are capable of translating legal rules into the
system-specific language necessary to influence senior management.266
Lawyers are uniquely equipped to use their persuasive and rhetorical skills
to reframe the social goals of TST in a manner that reinforces their value
and importance to the firm’s business.267 In other words, in-house lawyers
can—and should—help their clients identify, understand, and implement
the strategic dimensions of constructive discourse.
The ability of in-house lawyers to properly discharge their gatekeeping
functions can be compromised by cognitive bias, groupthink, and other
behavioral impediments that diminish their cognitive independence.268 In
addition, the effectiveness of lawyers’ gatekeeping function heavily
depends on the authority of in-house lawyers within a firm. This may vary
gathering to ensure that directors can effectively address conflicts between business and human rights);
see also Malloy, supra note 8, at 633 (noting the potential impact of regulation in facilitating review and
adjustment of internal operating procedures that impede non-compliance with disclosure obligations).
263
See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 261, at 121 (noting the routine monitoring and crisis
intervention functions of in-house counsel).
264
See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 488–89 (2008) (noting the positive effect of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the authority of general counsels vis-à-vis board directors and senior managers);
Patrick Schmidt, The Ethical Lives of Securities Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION
MAKING IN CONTEXT 221, 238–39 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (documenting how
securities lawyers use the fear of liability to advocate for greater disclosure by their clients).
265
Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 261, at 125–26.
266
See Karin Buhmann, Business and Human Rights: Analysing Discursive Articulation of
Stakeholder Interests to Explain the Consensus-Based Construction of the 'Protect, Respect, Remedy UN
Framework,’ 1 INT’L L. RES. 88, 94 (2012) (showing how stakeholders can influence corporate conduct
by translating CSR mandates, such as the Guiding Principles, into system-specific language that MNEs
can understand and implement).
267
See Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Business, Human Rights, & the Environment: The Role of the Lawyer
in CSR & Ethical Globalization, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 479, 494–95, 497 (2008) (arguing that
lawyers can use storytelling and story appreciation, among other skills, to strengthen the business case
for CSR).
268
See Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and
the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 508–15 (2012) (identifying the cognitive biases that
blinded in-house lawyers to the risks posed by subprime mortgages).
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widely based on seniority, their relationship with senior corporate
management, the deference accorded to in-house lawyers on discretionary
decisions of a legal nature, and the extent to which disclosure-related duties
are given instead to outside counsel.269 Due to their proximity to corporate
management, in-house lawyers may be particularly vulnerable to pressure
from their clients qua colleagues to “get the deal done”—i.e., in respect of
mandatory disclosure obligations, to disclose only as much as their
business-side clients want.270 This may lead lawyers to use standardized,
cautious, and ultimately less useful language in their disclosure—i.e., the
oft-maligned, but often useful, boilerplate.271 The indiscriminate use of
boilerplate by lawyers may adversely and unpredictably affect the ways in
which users of information process and respond to disclosure.272 Riskaverse behavior by lawyers is also enabled by the ambiguity of many
disclosure rules under U.S. federal securities law—most notably, the
concept of materiality.273 By not requiring materiality in order to trigger
disclosure, DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 remove discretion from lawyers
thereby eliminating one potential source of client pressure.
To overcome the challenges described above, in-house lawyers can
draw on the shared set of beliefs and knowledge that define them as
members of an epistemic community. An epistemic community is “a
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue area.”274 In a similar vein to the international
treaty making and policy coordination between governments described by
Robert Haas, corporate policy making can benefit from the engagement of
like-minded professionals who can converse in a shared vernacular, gather
and disseminate information, and convince leaders of their value.275
269
See Choudhary, Schloetzer & Sturgess, supra note 254, at 475; Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating
Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 128–32 (2006) (characterizing lawyers as
“dependent” gatekeepers whose responsibility to third parties is often in tension with their responsibility
to clients).
270
See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 457, 471 (2000).
271
See Schmidt, supra note 264, at 240–42 (documenting the use of boilerplate by securities lawyers
in disclosure documents); see also Davis, supra note 173, at 158 (describing the “cynical adoption of
token gestures decoupled from actual practice” as an impediment to the effectiveness of regulatory
requirements on corporate governance).
272
See Schmidt, supra note 264, at 241–42 (asking how securities lawyers can produce legally
compliant language in disclosure documents while refraining from pressuring clients to produce
meaningful information to the public).
273
See Laby, supra note 269, at 149–50.
274
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46
INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992). Haas further defined an epistemic community as based on a shared set of
normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy
enterprise. Id.
275
See id. at 15–16 (noting the ability of epistemic communities to define the self-interests of a state
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Epistemic communities of in-house lawyers defined by industry, issue area,
or regulatory focus can serve as a means for enhancing substantively
meaningful TST disclosure by firms.276
In the case of in-house counsel, their membership is driven by a
combination of (i) a lawyer’s professional training, (ii) externally imposed
disclosure requirements to which the firm is subject, and (iii) the internally
modulated judgment exercised by the lawyer to satisfy these externally
imposed requirements in respect of a given set of facts.277 A key
characteristic of this epistemic community of in-house counsel is that its
group function and the individual obligations of its members are defined by
their dual identity as employees of a corporation and as professionals.278
The functional and normative coherence of epistemic communities’ group
norms may be enforced through peer pressure and reputational awards
among themselves.279 Their shared professional ties may be strong enough
to compel compliance through “soft” community-imposed sanctions.280
Coinciding with the emergence of TST regimes, numerous initiatives to
inculcate in-house counsel on global social values have emerged in recent
years.281
or factions within it); see also Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community
Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT’L ORG. 187 (1992) (describing the impact of an
ecological epistemic community in influencing policymakers to respond to ozone depletion); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656 (1997) (suggesting
that epistemic communities consisting of international organizations, NGOs, and private foundations
help compel state compliance with international human rights).
276
See Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s Role in the
Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521, 543 (2012) (noting that industry
associations can serve as valuable sources of expertise that in-house counsel can draw on in crafting
compliance systems). This approach does not obviate the potential value of externally enforced
certification schemes and similar measures to improve the quality of mandatory disclosure. See, e.g.,
COFFEE, supra note 256, at 347–52 (proposing that issuers be required to appoint outside counsel to
monitor and certify the issuer's disclosure documents, which would be subject to SEC discipline for
failure to do so); Fox, supra note 253, at 1108–10 (proposing that investment banks instead of law firms
serve this role); Laby, supra note 269, at 160–61 (proposing that securities lawyers be required to certify
to the SEC that they are not aware of a material violation or have reported any such violation “up the
ladder” as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
277
See Schmidt, supra note 264, at 227–28 (referring to a “community of practice” of securities
lawyers and describing the difficulty in accurately identifying its members).
278
See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 270, at 478; Schmidt, supra note 264, at 237–38.
279
See Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals, and Compliance,
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 707–12 (2006); see also Ostas, supra note 162, at 593 (observing that a
corporate manager’s social responsibility is shaped by the social impact of his or her actions rather than
by a duty to obey the law).
280
The ABA’s professional responsibility code clarifies the fiduciary-like duties of lawyers to
stakeholders, including providing that “[a] lawyer . . . is . . . an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having a special responsibility for the quality of justice.” See Pitts III, supra note 267, at 491
(citing and quoting the preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
281
For example, the International Bar Association and the UN Global Compact have collaborated on
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3. Incentivizing Social Transparency Through Competition
Social transparency can be a competitive process—rather than merely
a “box-checking” compliance function—if the market recognizes and
rewards MNEs for producing a positive social impact.282 One way to
leverage the positive effects of market competition is to implement ratings
and other metrics of social performance.283 TST has the potential to go a
step further by incentivizing MNEs to disclose by using the carrot of
competition instead of the stick of compliance.284 This “carrot” approach
does not exempt MNEs from mandatory disclosure but rather conditions the
imposition of TST requirements on the MNE’s decision to enter a new
market or business.285
A carrot-based approach to TST is evident in connection with the
lifting of U.S. trade and investment sanctions against Burma in July
2012.286 Since 1997, the U.S. government has imposed a wide range of
sanctions against Burma for political oppression and widespread human
rights abuses committed by the Burmese military government.287 Under the
Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements, a U.S. company
may invest in Burma subject to the submission of an annual report on their
activities in the country.288 The disclosure requirements address a wide
a module-based video training manual targeted to in-house counsel interested in human rights, labor, the
environment, and anticorruption. See Int’l Bar Ass’n & UN Global Compact, Lawyers as Leaders –
Business and Human Rights Module, Lawyers as Leaders: The Essential Role of Legal Counsel in the
Corporate Sustainability Agenda, INT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=60827E49-44DF-43DE-94B2-11157DB1FDB9.
282
See Fung, Weil, Graham & Fagotto, supra note 27, at 15 (noting the potential impact of
disclosure when firms perceive benefits to disclosure vis-à-vis their competitors).
283
See Keenan, supra note 224, at 557–59 (proposing the creation and use of human rights ratings
by international financial institutions). But see Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 616 (warning that quantitative
data is insufficient to capture the full meaning of human rights).
284
See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law 37
(Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series, 2009/03, 2009) (citing the Hampton Review in the
United Kingdom, which proposed less regulatory inspection for companies that demonstrate themselves
to be responsible); see also PHILIP HAMPTON, HM TREASURY, REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS:
EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT, 2005, ¶ 2.24 (2005), available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ files/file22988.pdf (noting the use of “earned autonomy” by U.K. regulators).
285
Cf. Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 383 (2013) (justifying carrots for sellers to reveal information only when it is
unclear which party is the least-cost information gatherer).
286
See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Easing of Sanctions on
Burma (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/11/statementpresident-easing-sanctions-burma (announcing the “easing [of] restrictions to allow U.S. companies to
responsibly do business in Burma”).
287
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, BURMA SANCTIONS
PROGRAM (2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
burma.pdf.
288
See Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,106, 37,119 (amending 31 C.F.R. §
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range of social impacts associated with U.S. business investment in Burma,
including human rights, labor rights, land rights, community consultations
and stakeholder engagement, environmental stewardship, anticorruption,
arrangements with security service providers, risk and impact assessment
and mitigation, payments to the Burmese government, any investments with
the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), and contact with the
Burmese military or nonstate armed groups.289 In contrast to the TST
regimes under U.S. federal securities law examined in this Article, the
Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements use mandatory
disclosure as a means to promote discretionary business activity, rather than
as a condition to continued business activity. Future initiatives to
implement TST under U.S. federal securities law may be amenable to this
carrot-like approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The observations in this Article present a number of interesting
empirical and normative questions concerning the use of constructive
discourse and TST. In particular, one area for future scholarly exploration
concerns the effectiveness of TST along several differentiating factors: (i)
noncorporate business organizations, most notably various types of
partnerships; (ii) different policy objectives, such as environmental
sustainability and labor rights; (iii) the interaction of multiple policy
objectives within the same TST regime, exemplified by the various
statutory mandates of ITRA § 219; and (iv) the impact of TST regimes on
MNEs’ existing relationships with different stakeholder groups.
The use of mandatory disclosure as a means of facilitating social
transparency reveals the challenges of global governance. TST regimes
such as DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 have emerged in the context of an
increasingly diverse, and sometimes conflicting, array of mandatory and
voluntary corporate social reporting systems.
The integrative and
expressive dimensions of mandatory disclosure, evident in the concept of
constructive discourse, suggest specific ways that MNEs can use the
process and output of TST for their own benefit.

537.530); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OMB NO. 1405-0209, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
Responsible-Investment-Reporting-Requirements-Final.pdf. This annual reporting requirement applies
to any new investment in Burma over $500,000.
289
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: BURMA RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-burmaresponsible-investment-reporting-requirements.
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